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It is difficult to define blasphemy. What is regarded as blasphemous will depend on the 
values prevalent in a given society. In general, it includes denigrating and insulting 
expressions targeted toward God and other aspects of religion. My thesis is that blasphemy, 
to the extent it should be dealt with by the law, should be regarded a sub-category of hate 
speech. The law should concern itself only with those aspects of blasphemy which incite 
hatred against a group which is identifiable on the basis of religion. More specifically, I 
argue that Pakistan should repeal its blasphemy law (s. 295-c Penal Code, 1860) because 
blasphemous prosecutions are politically, socially, economically and culturally motivated 
while religion is only used as a legitimizing tool by opportunists. 
Canada is an example in this regard. While the Canadian Criminal Code prohibition of 
blasphemous libel (s. 296) is vague and would likely be held to infringe freedom of 
expression unjustifiably, the hate speech provisions of the Criminal Code are much more 
precisely worded and have been upheld by the Supreme Court of Canada as a justifiable 
infringement of freedom of expression.  Thus, the argument of this thesis is that the 
approach taken in s. 319(2) offers a useful model for modernizing Pakistan’s laws on 
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1. Blasphemy  
It is difficult to define blasphemy. What is regarded as blasphemous will depend on 
the values prevalent in a given society. Further, even if a sufficiently precise 
definition could be developed, there are difficulties inherent in fairly and 
consistently prosecuting an offence that focuses on words, not actions. There is no 
crime scene and very little objective evidence will be available.  Given this, critics 
argue that blasphemy is a “noose” around the neck of speakers that could be pulled 
by anyone if the speaker belongs to the unpopular side.1 The overly broad offence of 
blasphemy is defined in the Criminal Code of Canada in section 2962 and in the Penal 
Code of Pakistan under s.295-c3 in the following words: 
S. 296 of the Canadian Criminal Code: 
1) Everyone who publishes a blasphemous libel is guilty of an indictable 
offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years. 
2) It is a question of fact whether or not any matter that is published is a 
blasphemous libel. 
No person shall be convicted of an offence under this section for expressing 
in good faith and decent language, or attempting to establish by argument 
used in good faith and conveyed in decent language, an opinion on religious 
subject. 
                                                          
1 Jerome Neu, Sticks and Stones: The Philosophy of Insults (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2009) at 202. 
2Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, s. 296. 





S. 295-c of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860: 
Whoever by words either spoken or written, or by visible representation, or 
by any imputation, innuendo or insinuation directly or indirectly, defiles the 
sacred name of the Holy Prophet Muhammad (P.B.U.H) shall be punished to 
death and shall also be liable to fine. 
In this thesis I will argue that blasphemy, to the extent it should be dealt with by the 
law, should be regarded a sub-category of hate speech.4In other words, the law 
should concern itself only with those aspects of blasphemy which incite hatred 
against a group which is identifiable on the basis of religion. More specifically, I 
argue that Pakistan should repeal its blasphemy laws and instead introduce a 
criminal provision patterned on the Canadian hate speech section of the Criminal 
Code. In this chapter, thus, I provide a comparative context for the later discussion of 
Pakistan’s blasphemy law. 
Greeks used a broad offence of “impiety” to prosecute speaking contemptuously or 
using profane language against religion or Greek deities. Further, drunkenness, 
black magic, sacrilege of religious places or objects in religion were also considered 
“impiety.”5 Religion was considered an integral part of the state and so impious 
                                                          
4 Ivan Hare & James Weinstein, Extreme Speech and Democracy (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2010) at 291. 
5 Leonard Levy, Treason against God: a History of the Offense of Blasphemy, 1sted 
(Schocken Books, 1981) at 7. 
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actions were seen as shocking behavior which threatened the state. Therefore, 
impiety was punished severely.6 
Examples of those who were prosecuted for impiety include a famous sculptor who 
wrote his name under the shield held by a statue of a Greek god; Greek scientists 
and philosophers who failed to attribute the universe to a divine power; and  most 
notably, Socrates, who was executed for claiming that the sun and the moon were 
not gods. Consequently, his most famous pupil, Plato, learned from his teacher’s 
mistake, and attributed his theory of the creation of the universe to a divine and 
powerful sovereign.7 Whether the real objective behind these prosecutions was 
religious or political remains buried in history.  
In Judaism, blasphemy and its punishment were established in the time of Moses, 
who led a loose confederation of Jewish tribes out of Egypt promising them a free 
land and blessings of God. Always skeptical about Moses’ prophet-hood and the 
existence of God, the tribes insisted on miracles as proof. Eventually, they created a 
golden idol shaped like a cow and even plotted to kill Moses on his return from 
Mount Sinai. In response to this, Moses received these words from God: 
 Bring out of the camp him who cursed; and all who heard him lay their 
hands upon his head, and that all the congregation shall stone him. And say 
to the people of Israel, whoever curses his God shall bear his sin. He who 
blasphemes the name of the Lord shall be put to death…”8 Thus, the 
punishment for blasphemy and what constituted blasphemy was born. In 
                                                          
6 Leonard Levy, Blasphemy: Verbal offense Against the Sacred, from Moses to Salman 
Rushdie, 1sted (Knopf, 1993) at 31. 
7Levy, supra note 5 at 14. 
8Ibid at 17; Neu, supra note 1 at 204.  
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sum, according to the Jewish religion only cursing or swearing in the name of 
God was considered as a crime of blasphemy.9 
 
Thus, Jews regarded the rebellion towards God as blasphemy. This was still a quite 
broad scope, but was considered narrow since it excluded blasphemy towards 
religious objects and persons. Blasphemers were prosecuted by Jews in order to 
avoid the wrath of God, hence offering them in sacrifice just like animals to manifest 
their loyalty to God and disapproval for His enemies. Likewise, Jews 
excommunicated blasphemers so that they would not anger God by giving shelter to 
them.10 
As with the Greeks and Jews, punishment for blasphemy in early Christian 
understanding was also death.11 However, modern Christianity has rejected this 
orthodox concept and now hate speech laws cover this field of offence as would be 
seen later in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 of this thesis.  Nonetheless, a brief exegesis of 
the history of blasphemy in the early Christian tradition is in order. 
In summary, blasphemy in early Christian times included: persecuting Christians; 
doubting Jesus’ power to stop his crucifixion; doubting Jesus’ miracles and 
teachings; posing as Jesus; claiming oneself equal to Jesus; and cursing, reproaching, 
criticizing or mocking Jesus.12 By 400 A.D, nearly everything fell under this broad 
                                                          
9 David Lawton, Blasphemy (University of Pennsylvania Press, 1993) at 47. 
10Neu, supra note 1 at 196. 
11Lawton, supra note 9 at 49.  
12Levy, supra note 6 at 33-34. 
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definition of blasphemy. Given this, the Catholic Church, with the coercive power of 
the civil rulers at its back, emerged as the main defender of the one true faith. Many 
faithful Christians were burnt alive or otherwise prosecuted as they were 
considered blasphemers merely for having disagreement or disbelief on any 
religious point. As Leonard Levy has noted, “The view that blasphemy consisted of 
any religious belief contrary to the policies of the Church or its leadership, [was] a 
fixed position in Christian thought for prosecuting blasphemy”.13 Hence, blasphemy 
law served as Frankenstein’s monster: for killing of Christians was considered a 
blasphemous act and a negation of Christian faith conducive to conflict and wars; 
but numerous faithful Christians were prosecuted under these very laws by the 
Church itself.14 
At various times in the past, Christianity considered blasphemy nearly the same as 
impiety, “idolatry, sacrilege, heresy… profanity… [and] treason.”15 On the contrary, 
the word ‘Blasphemy’ finds its origins in the late-Greek era, meaning to “injure” by 
“utterance, talk, speech” and/or “a speaking ill, impious speech and slander.”16 Jews 
interpreted the concept of blasphemy as to “pronounce aloud and to curse” or 
“hurting by speaking.”17 
                                                          
13Levy, supra note 5 at 3. 
14Ibid at 103-122; Levy, supra note 6 at 31. 
15Ibid at 4. 
16 Leonard Levy, Blasphemy: Verbal offense Against the Sacred, from Moses to 
Salman Rushdie, 1sted (Knopf, 1993); David Lawton, Blasphemy (University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1993); David Nash, Blasphemy in Modern Britain: 1789 to the 
Present (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999). 
17Lawton, supra note 9 at 14. 
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Blasphemy took its modern shape by evolving from the middle age English word 
“Blasfemen” and the old French “Blasfemer,”18 and meant “speaking any evil thing of 
God, making war with heaven itself… flying as it were in the face of the 
Almighty…scoffing at religion, and speaking reproachfully of God’s ordinances…”19 
In the Catholic encyclopedia, blasphemy was defined as a “mortal sin [and] the 
greatest.”20In the main, it consisted of expressions or acts which scurrilously vilified, 
ridiculed or otherwise reviled God, sacred persons, objects or the cornerstone ideals 
of religion. 
 For some theologians, blasphemy includes situations where men deny what belongs 
to God, ascribing something unbefitting with Him, or ascribe men with the qualities 
which are exclusive for God. Therefore, it is seen as an intemperate and unjustified 
attack rather than a product of good conscience and intellect. On the other side of 
the spectrum, blasphemy is described as a deliberate malicious attempt to shock 
believers, and threaten a society’s peace and tranquility. Thus, blasphemy is not 
only made punishable on a religious basis, but also considered as “treason” against a 
community and a state.21 
Some supporters of blasphemy laws argue that anyone who rebels against God 
ought to be punished.22 Others contend that such a vague and subjective definition 
could include gambling, drinking, impiety, hypocrisy or any other action that 
                                                          
18Levy, supra note 16. 
19Lawton, supra note 9 at 15. 
20Ibid at 6. 
21Levy, supra note 5 at 5-6; Levy, supra note 6 at 297-299. 
22Lawton, supra note 9 at 15. 
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disobeys God’s commandments.  Such a broad understanding of blasphemy could 
allow for the prosecution of political, artistic, scientific and literary speech.23 
As sections set out above show, mens rea (in this context: intention to denigrate God, 
Prophets, Holy books etc) is not a compulsory ingredient of the offense and is 
generally presumed from the mere action of blasphemy. Secondly, the definition 
cannot apply to more than one religion, for one religion’s expression may often be 
viewed as another’s blasphemy. Further, court cases do not provide sufficient 
guidance in defining blasphemy, since Canadian cases were decided pre-Charter24 
and the ones in Pakistan have had many defects in them. I argue that blasphemy is a 
‘dogmatic subject’ that increases radicalism in society. Therefore, there is a dire 
need to repeal the offence of blasphemy and introduce more modern hate speech 
laws which will focus on social problems rather than an unachievable ideal of 
religious piousness in society. Thus, my thesis is that blasphemy should not be a 
separate crime instead some aspects of blasphemy should be dealt with under a 
more modern conception of carefully designed hate speech laws.25 A detailed 
explanation of this argument will be made in Chapter 3 and 4 of this thesis. But in 
this chapter I will focus on modern legislative methods adopted in various countries 
to amend their approach towards blasphemy laws, and on general arguments in 
favour and against blasphemy laws. In conclusion, I argue that the offence of 
blasphemy must be repealed but the concept should be modernized as a part of 
                                                          
23Ibid at 45. 
24Canadian Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, s 1, Part 1 of the Constitution 
Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c 11. 
25Ibid at 17; Neu, supra note 1 at 204. 
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narrowly designed hate speech laws. Similarly, punishments prescribed for the 
offence of blasphemy, after being stipulated as hate speech, must extensively be 
curtailed. Overall, I suggest, no punishment for rigid blasphemy law but a lesser 
degree of punishment for a modern hate speech offence as practiced in countries 
with hate speech or religious vilification laws. 
Next I state some modern approaches to blasphemy adopted in various countries. 
2.  Modern Approaches to Blasphemy 
Blasphemy laws are or were prevalent in many countries like Denmark, England, 
France, Germany, India, Ireland, Norway, New Zealand, Scotland, Spain, [Canada and 
Pakistan], Switzerland and Sweden. Furthermore, in most of these countries, 
punishments are or were very nominal, coupled with the fact that courts required 
strict evidentiary standards for prosecuting a blasphemer. In this regard, the 
following discussion gives a brief overview of jurisdictions like the U.S, Australia and 
some European countries in the hope to show how these countries have liberated 
themselves from the rigid and age old clutches of Blasphemy. However, a detailed 
discussion regarding blasphemy laws in Pakistan and Canada will be made 
subsequently in the relevant chapters. 
2.1. United States 
Despite the United States’ strong historical commitment to freedom of speech, in 
1837, a court observed that citizens had a right to enjoy their religion “without 
interruption or disturbance” and that blasphemous libel “struck at the foundation of 
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civil society.”26 The court held that blasphemy laws defended society from “gross 
violation of decency and good order”, preventing blasphemers from corrupting 
public morals and peace.27 
However, in 1968, an Appellate Court in Maryland struck down the states’ 
blasphemy provision set out in a 1723 statute by declaring it unconstitutional.28 
Since then, the U.S Supreme Court has not ruled on the constitutionality of the 
offence of blasphemy, but it is unlikely that such an offence would withstand a 
constitutional challenge in the United States today. 
2.2. Australia 
The last two prosecutions in Australia for blasphemy occurred in 1871 and 1919.  
The provision was invoked as recently as in 1998, but the court refused to allow the 
prosecution, based on the principle of ‘desuetude’.29  However, some aspects of 
blasphemy have been retained by several states in their religious vilification laws 
                                                          
26 Justin Kirk Houser, “Is Hate Speech Becoming the New Blasphemy? Lessons from 
an American Constitutional Dialectic” (2009) 114:2 Penn State Law Review 571 at 
573 (HO). 
27Ibid at 585; Delaware v. Chandler Del. 553, 1837 WL 154 (Gen. Sess. 1837). 
28 State v. West, 263 A. 2d, 602 (Md. App. 1970). 
29The Oxford English Dictionary, 2d ed, sub verbo “Desuetude”. The principle of 
desuetude is defined as denoting something in a state of disuse. In a legal sense 
when a principle becomes obsolete for so much time it cannot be effectively re-
invoked after such gap. 
10 
 
which are somewhat similar to modern hate speech provisions.30 To give an 
example, Victoria’s Racial and Religious Tolerance Act, 200131 reads as follows: 
Section 8: 
(1) A person must not, on the ground of the religious belief or activity of 
another person or class of persons, engage in conduct that incites hatred 
against, serious contempt for, or revulsion or severe ridicule of, that other 
person or class of persons.  
Note: "engage in conduct" includes use of the internet or e-mail to publish or 
transmit statements or other material.  
(2) For the purposes of sub-section (1), conduct—  
(a) may be constituted by a single occasion or by a number of occasions over 
a period of time; and  
(b) may occur in or outside Victoria. 
 
2.3. European Approach 
After lengthy negotiations with the Anglican Church, England repealed its 
blasphemy laws in June 2008. These laws had been criticized as discriminatory 
because they protected only Christianity. England also replaced its blasphemy law 
with narrower provisions in its Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006,32 and Criminal 
Justice and Immigration Act 2008,33 which deal with the issue of discrimination on 
basis of religious hatred in the U.K. 
                                                          
30 Jeremy Patrick, “Not Dead, Just Sleeping: Canada’s Prohibition on Blasphemous 
Libel as a Case Study in Obsolete Legislation” (2008) 41 UBCLR 193 at 7 (Dalhousie 
online Libraries); Osama Siddique & Zahra Hayat, “Unholy Speech and Holy Laws: 
Blasphemy Laws in Pakistan—Controversial origins, Design Defects and Free 
Speech Implications” (2008) 17:2 Minnesota Journal of International Law 303 at 
355 (SSRN). 
31Racial and Religious Tolerance Act (Vic), s 8. 
32Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006 (UK), c 1. 
33Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 (UK), c 4. 
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In Netherlands, article 147 on blasphemy of the Dutch Penal Code, 1881 was 
concerned with expressions made only against God not saints and other religious 
figures.34 Likewise, mere proof of willfulness was not sufficient to establish guilt for 
the offence of blasphemy. For instance, if the speaker was cognizant of the fact that 
his expression may cause breach of peace, this alone circumstance would not have 
been considered enough to prove intention. Instead, such intent had to be ‘scornful’ 
clearly manifesting that the speaker had willfully intended to hurt the religious 
feelings of a certain class. This criterion of ‘scornfulness’ was a limit on the misuse of 
blasphemy law as it made it hard to establish guilt and was a discretion lying with 
the court exercised on a case to case basis.35 There was a decade of debate between 
those who called for making the application of these laws lenient and those who 
wanted to abolish them. Finally, they were repealed on 5th December 2012. 
3. Critical Analyses of Blasphemy 
Arguments in favour and against blasphemy laws are pursued in the following 
sections. 
3.1. Arguments in Favour of Blasphemy Laws 
3.1A. Blasphemy: the Greatest Sin of Sins as Against the Greatest King of Kings 
Thomas Aquinas, a highly reputable theological scholar from 13th century Italy, 
proposed a very harsh policy against blasphemers. Contours of his approach can 
                                                          
34Dutch Penal Code 1881 (Netherland), s 147. 
35Siddique , supra note 30 at 356. 
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still be observed in the blasphemy law of various Muslim countries. Aquinas 
believed that blasphemy was the greatest of the sins, targeting the greatest king of 
all kings. He claimed that blasphemy was even greater a crime than murder, as 
murder was a crime against another person but blasphemy was a crime against the 
creator Himself. Therefore, he argued that blasphemy must be punished with death, 
as any lesser punishment similarly amounted to blasphemy. Aquinas believed in 
death of all blasphemers.36 
3.1B. Blasphemy: A Threat to Religious and Constitutional Structure 
Other historic proponents of blasphemy laws argued that blasphemy threatens the 
very basis of religion and society.37 Blackstone in 18th century Britain argued that an 
attack on religion is an assault upon the very roots of society, morality, decency, 
communal values, social order and public peace, the values that the state is 
responsible for protecting.38Somewhat different argument may be put forward in 
connection with religion-based laws that blasphemy may be seen as a step toward 
secularization and anarchy. Thus, Anti-blasphemy laws are then justified as 
necessary to protect societies.39 
 
 
                                                          
36Levy, supra note 5 at 108-113. 
37Siddique, supra note 30 at 307. 
38Houser, supra note 26 at 585-588. 
39Hare, supra note 4 at 301. 
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3.1C. Religion Based Laws as a Means of Preventing Violence 
In countries with religion-based laws, some also argue that prohibiting blasphemy 
also limits the possibility of vigilante violence by those offended by blasphemy. Thus 
these laws are seen as preventing breach of public peace in society.40 
4. Counter Arguments to Blasphemy Laws 
4.1 Is Blasphemy Really a Religious Crime? 
Secular scholars acknowledge that blasphemous statements relate to religion, but 
some argue that such statements might well be understood as a form of political 
speech that must not be regulated unless reasonably justified. Their main argument 
is that a state uses blasphemy laws to shut down the critical expression of those who 
question government’s power as established under the notion of religion.41 
4.2 Blasphemy: Misreading of Innocent Ideas 
Some scholars argue that those who are accused of blasphemy do not mean to be 
offensive. Instead, these blasphemers try to talk about important causes of the 
chaotic nature in society, but it is the other people who misunderstand them. As 
well, it is suggested that the only reason people are accused of blasphemy is because 
their ideas challenge those in control of religious institutions who believe that any 
new idea revolting against the set religious ideals in society amounts to rebellion 
                                                          
40Nash, supra note 16 at 3. 
41Ibid; Lawton, supra note 9 at 44 & 110-114; Joss Marsh, Word Crimes: Blasphemy, 
Culture, and Literature in Nineteenth-Century England (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1998) at 19. 
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against God’s commandments.42 Thus, they claim, prosecuting people on the basis of 
mere offensiveness and disagreement towards what others believe must not be 
allowed.  
 4.3 Blasphemy: A Communal Clash 
Some critics oppose blasphemy laws on the reasoning that it is not a religious 
offence, rather, a communal disagreement between two groups. Thus, they believe 
that punishment for such an offence which does not target God but only a 
community collectively ought not be awarded. Thus, they claim that blasphemy laws 
must be abolished and other criminal laws in respect of protecting peace and order 
should be used to control such disorder in society.43 
In support of their claim, they argue that incidents of blasphemy often occur where 
society is divided on different social identities. Similarly, in many of the cases 
pertaining to allegations of blasphemy, the complainant and accused come from 
nearly the same background sharing commonalities among them regarding their 
place of residence, religion or social status etc. Hence, allegations of blasphemy are 
often a result of power struggle between two conflicting groups due to which simple 
expression, disagreement, novel thinking or disbelief may become a reason for 
prosecution under broad blasphemy laws.44 
                                                          
42Lawton, supra note 9 at 1-3 & 43: the form of religious fundamentalism in the 
service of the civil authorities 




These critics, therefore, claim that blasphemy is simply a difference of opinion 
between two groups living in a community, but it is maliciously and readily 
converted into a battleground of religious beliefs and moral standards by 
opportunists. Therefore, it is safely argued that blasphemy laws are indeed used as a 
tool by those who are in power in such divided communities to prosecute, 
marginalize and eradicate those having a viewpoint different from the predominant 
majority.45 
4.4 Blasphemy laws:  A Wrong Approach for Achieving Standard of Unity in 
Society 
Phillip Furneaux, a non-conformist minister of 18th century Britain, suggested that 
inquisitiveness and ingenious thinking ought to be permitted in religious matters, 
because the most sacred and cherished values in a society are inherently capable of 
protecting themselves against false ideas and malicious accusations. Furneaux also 
asserted that religion benefits from discourse which allows the truth to emerge. 
Further, he held that modern religions must also show leniency and should not 
prohibit others to do the same which they did in their developing stages.46 
Thus, critics argue that blasphemy laws are a wrong approach for achieving 
standard of unity in society, since they threaten people by imposing severe 
punishments for actions which are not even specifically defined or known by the so 
called blasphemers. Further, they contend that blasphemy laws are orders from a 
                                                          
45Ibid. 
46Houser, supra note 26 at 616. 
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higher governmental authority dictating public as to what is right and what is wrong 
for them. Thus, this defeats the ideals of promoting individual dignity, reasoning and 
intellectual liberties that are considered to be a more sound and democratic way of 
achieving unity as compared to punishing or removing people from society by the 
government.47 
4.5 Is Blasphemy an Insult to God? 
Critics reject that insults to God must be punished to avoid divine wrath, since He is 
Almighty who is able to defend His name and realm without help from anyone.48 
Besides this, it is not God who feels insulted and then reacts, but the orthodox 
religious community which apprehends danger in novel ideas. So, the threatened 
religious community repulses them with as much power as it can gather to counter 
any such movement which may sow the seeds of transformation or modernization 
in societal beliefs. These critics maintain that blasphemous statements offend 
private persons in a community, so the standard of punishment should be according 
to the standards mentioned in other laws. 
5. Conclusion  
The job of the state is not to protect a heavenly authority but instead its job has been 
explicitly ordained by such authority to maintain social tranquility and peace in 
society. Therefore, it is the primary duty of a state to protect its citizens from crimes 
and only after the accomplishment of this goal it can seek the unachievable task of 
                                                          
47Levy, supra note 6 at 314. 
48Ibid at 317. 
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religious piousness by protection of divine authorities. So, unless a state does not 
perform its basic duty of preventing harms done to its citizens, both by others and 
the government itself,  it should not go for avenging harms made to the name of God 
with severe punishments on the basis of a broad concept like Blasphemy. Hence, on 
a rational basis, the offence of blasphemy must be repealed but the concept in 
general should be modernized as a part of narrowly designed hate speech laws. 
Punishment prescribed for the offence of blasphemy, after being stipulated as 
punishments of hate speech, must be extensively curtailed. It is indeed not the 
religion which is being targeted but only the political or fundamentalist framework 
of society. No punishment for orthodox blasphemy law, but rather a lesser degree of 
punishment for the modern hate speech offence is required as is practiced in 
countries with such laws. Therefore, I will discuss my analysis and suggestions on 
this approach in Chapter 4. At this juncture, I will reiterate my thesis that 
blasphemous prosecutions are politically, socially, economically and culturally 
motivated while religion is only used as a legitimizing tool by opportunists. So, these 
draconian laws need transformation in terms of making them narrow and specific 
with lenient punishments keeping in view the standards of the modern legal 









The Hate Speech Debate 
1. Introduction 
This chapter first defines hate speech, and then considers relevant arguments 
against, and in support of censoring free expression with the aim to prohibit hate 
speech (including blasphemous statements that meet the test for hate speech). 
Although freedom of expression is a quintessential right in a democracy, it has an 
interactive relationship with other fundamental rights. No right is absolute; thus 
there is room for some regulation of free expression even in a society that has 
freedom of speech as a fundamental democratic value.  For this reason, a narrowly 
designed criminal provision which prohibits hate speech, while clearly defining 
what is prohibited and providing appropriate defenses, is a justified limit on 
freedom of expression. 
2. What Is Hate Speech? 
There is not a single exact definition for hate speech which may work in all 
jurisdictions with multifarious historical, legal, cultural and religious backgrounds 
and with reference to various targeted groups. My purpose here is to provide for 
Pakistan a workable definition of hate speech, after discussing various ways of 
thinking about hate speech in light of Canadian law. The latter, holds substantial 
guidance for countries like Pakistan that need to tighten their broad criminal laws. 
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 Hate speech can be a direct or indirect attack by a majority on a minority group 
with the sole objective to intimidate and humiliate. It can be an attempt to persuade 
a dominant group of the inferiority of a minority group. It can also be an expression 
propagated by one minority group towards another, or by a minority group toward 
the majority.49 In general, hate speech means willful promotion of hatred that is 
hostile, malicious, and motivated by bias.50 Consequently, it is intimidating, 
harassing, degrading and victimizing.51 Such speech targets an individual or group 
on the basis of some actual or perceived distinctive characteristics.52 For these 
reasons, it incites discrimination, probably violence and hatred within society.53 
 It is appropriate to note here that I favour allowing disagreement, satire, political 
and academic discussion, etc., which may ‘unintentionally’ cause hatred or violence 
in society. As well, I think that a government must judge expression in light of its 
                                                          
49Hare, supra note 4 at 213; Kent Greenawalt, Fighting Words: Individuals, 
Communities, and Liberties of Speech (Princeton University Press, 1996) at 64; Mari 
J. Matsuda et al, Words That Wound: Critical Race Theory, Assaultive Speech, and the 
First Amendment (New Perspectives on Law, Culture, & Society) (West view Press, 
1993) at 39. 
50 Raphael Cohen-Almagor, “Fighting Hate and Bigotry on the Internet” (2011) 3:3 
Policy and Internet: university of Hull at 3 (SSRN).  
51 James Banks, “European Regulation of Cross-Border Hate Speech in Cyberspace: 
The Limits of Legislation” (2011) 19 European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and 
Criminal Justice at 2 (SSRN). 
52 O. Bakircioglu, “Freedom of Expression and Hate Speech” (2008) 16 Tulsa Journal 
of Comparative and International Law at 4 (Dalhousie Online Libraries). 
53Almagor, supra note 50; Greenwalt, supra note 49 at 50; Alexander Tsesis, “Dignity 
and Speech: The Regulation of Hate Speech in a Democracy” (2009) 44 Wake Forest 
Law Review at 517 (Dalhousie Online Libraries); Bhikhu Parekh, “Hate Speech: Is 
there a case for banning?” (2006) 12:4 Public Policy Research at 217 (Dalhousie 
Online Libraries); Richard Delgado & Jean Stefan, Must We Defend Nazis: Hate 
Speech, Pornography, and the New First Amendment (NYUP, 1999) at 129. 
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context before deciding whether it should be regulated or not. If a speaker had not 
intended for adverse effects to occur, he must not be charged for an offence of hate 
speech. In this case, it is the listeners’ response that makes the expression to come 
across as bad and not that the speaker himself intended for such hatred or violence 
to take place in society. However, if the expression willfully promotes hatred, thus 
inviting violence, it can be regulated whether violence occurred or not.54 The burden 
of proof is on the state to show that the speaker had ‘intentionally’ made a hateful 
expression, and it must be a substantial burden of proof to satisfy a criminal 
prohibition.55 Given this, scholars present different views on how to regulate hate 
speech. A detailed analysis of the arguments for and against hate speech regulation 




                                                          
54R. v. Buzzanga and Durocher (1979), 49 CCC (2d) 369, (Ont. CA) Martin JA 
[Buzzanga]. 
55  I believe that political, academic, and media’s expression might well hold the 
highest grounds in a democracy, but it does not mean that whenever false assertions 
are made through these powerful platforms, targeting a specific group on basis of 
some distinctive characteristic, they cannot be regulated. Any such expression that 
promotes distasteful opinions against a certain class of people due to their 
distinctive presence in society should not be left free to taint a society. Indeed, 
governments should give levity to expression falling under these categories, which 
may ‘unintentionally’ cause hatred or violence. But, they must analyze the context in 
which the expression is made and only then decide whether the intention was to 
promote hatred in society or whether it was just political criticism, genuine inquiry, 
mockery, etc demanding censorship.  
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3. The Hate Speech Debate 
3.1 Non-Regulation of Hate Speech: “The Market Place of Ideas” 
Opponents of speech regulation believe that hate speech is a sub-category of free 
expression, and that it is intrinsically important for the development of intellectual 
thought in society. They claim that there should not be any governmental 
censorship of hate speech. Indeed, they compare the ‘market place of ideas’ to an 
‘economic market place,’ and insist that as good practices emerge inherently in the 
economic market place, so do they also occur in the ‘market place of ideas’ when 
governments do not interfere. In this respect, John Stuart Mill noted that all opinions 
and ideas ought to be free in the market place without any influence from 
government.56 He thought that truth is most likely to emerge when ideas are given 
an equal opportunity to convince their audience. He claimed that people will resort 
to independent reasoning to decipher truth from falsehood regarding prevalent 
issues in society, and do not need a didactic government to tell them what is right or 
wrong.  Further, he proposed that if a person knows relevant information about an 
issue, he is less likely to make a bad decision. Therefore, Mill claimed that free 
speech gives the power of thought to individuals to decide for themselves what is 
best without any fear of authoritative regulation of their thought.57 
                                                          
56 Kent Greenwalt, Speech, Crime, and the Uses of Language (Oxford University Press, 
1989) at 17. 
57 Franklyn Saul Haiman, Speech and Law in a Free Society (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1981) at 99. 
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Similarly, Ronald Dworkin notes that: 
Politics is more likely to discover truth and eliminate error, or to produce 
good rather than bad policies, if political discussion is free and uninhibited… 
Government insults its citizens, and denies their moral responsibility, when it 
decrees that they cannot be trusted to hear opinions that might persuade 
them to dangerous or offensive convictions. We retain our dignity, as 
individuals, only by insisting that no one… no official and no majority…has 
the right to withhold an opinion from us on the ground that we are not fit to 
hear and consider it.58 
Thus, Dworkin criticizes government attempts to dictate what kinds of speech are 
allowed. He also argues that an individual must be free to decide for himself, and 
free to discuss his opinions with others in society. He asserts that governments 
ought not to regulate any opinions, no matter how hideous and distasteful those 
may be, in an attempt to prevent injury to others.59 
Other scholars argue that principles of autonomy and equality require that a person 
must be given full liberty to exchange his views with others and his views must be 
entitled to equal recognition with those of others.60 Robert Post, for example, holds 
that the essence of democracy is that individuals should be autonomous in forming 
                                                          
58 Ronald Dworkin, Freedom’s Law: The Moral Reading of the American Constitution 
(Boston: Harvard University Press, 1997) at 200. 
59Ibid at 200-202. 
60Hare, supra note 4 at 169-171. Scholars believe that autonomy is of two kinds i.e. 
‘formal’ and ‘substantive’ autonomy. Formal autonomy suggests that a government 
must not regulate ideas of its people, no matter how repulsive, repugnant or 
abhorrent those may be. Because, when a government censors views of a person, he 
cannot be considered autonomous or equal in society.  Furthermore, formal 
autonomy of one individual does not collide with formal autonomy of another in 
society.  However, it may conflict with a person’s substantive autonomy which 
means that a person has a right to spend his life in best possible ways without fear 
of interference or harm. Contrarily, substantive autonomy can obstruct both formal 
and substantive autonomy of other citizens. Therefore, these exponents consider it 
inferior in value than the formal one.  
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opinions through their own observations rather than blindly follow orders 
emanating from an authority. Greenwalt maintains that freedom of expression is a 
highly valuable right which must not be censored. In his view, expression is what 
makes us know who we are, as it gives us power to enjoy our liberty, form our 
thoughts and express our feelings to others.61 Lee Bollinger corroborates these 
views by arguing that although hate speech is harmful, still it must be given 
protection in a democratic country. While hate speakers try to incite religious 
warfare by using the power of wrongful words, responsible citizens can resort to 
good reasoning to discourage and reject their propaganda. He claims that a society 
which can tolerate harmful expression, like hate speech, reinforces its belief in real 
democracy.62 
To summarize, scholars who reject the regulation of any speech claim that the 
autonomy of an individual must not be sacrificed for collective reasons, as this 
would create a society based on inequality and discrimination. Further, these 
scholars reject the argument that hate speech creates violence and hatred 
threatening the public good. Hate speech, in their view, consists of mere opinions, 
and it would be nearly impossible to decide which opinions to criminalize.63 Also, a 
                                                          
61Richard J. Moon, The Constitutional Protection of Freedom of Expression (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2000) at 20. 
62Matsuda, supra note 49 at 18. 
63Hare, supra note 4 at 149. [T]he hope of those favoring hate speech prohibitions 
must be that enforcement will be meaningful and effective at a quite early stage. 
Pessimism about this speculative hope seems justified. First, are generic doubts 
about likelihood of effective legal enforcement. More important, however, is the 
likelihood that at this most relevant stage the speech that meaningfully contributes 
to developing or sustaining racism will be subtle, quotidian and, to many people, 
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hate speaker is likely to have been motivated by previous hateful expressions made 
by others, therefore a government cannot control this connected web of hatred. If it 
tries to do so, it would impede more speech than is desired or necessary.64 
Interestingly, their chief argument is that hate speech is also a form of public 
discourse which helps to form public opinion. They think that when hate speakers 
make their views known, it allows for analysis of their ideas, as opposed to forming 
opinions about them based on emotions and subjective inclinations.65 To them, 
therefore, when a government proscribes an idea as hate speech, it actually deters 
free thinking, autonomy and equality of its subjects as to making their own 
choices.66 
Before I refute some of these arguments, I will summarize arguments from those 
who support regulation of hate speech.  
                                                          
seemingly inoffensive or at least not ‘seriously’ offensive speech. This speech is 
likely to fly under the legal radar screen and, in any event, meaningful enforcement 
of prohibitions against this speech is even less likely. Thus, even given a belief that 
racist speech contributes significantly to virulent racism and genocidal practice 
[Edwin Baker’s] hypothesis is that at earlier stages legal prohibitions will not cover 
or be effectively enforced against the most relevant speech and at later stages 
enforcement will not occur, will be counter-productive in creating martyrs for a 
racist cause, or will focus on the wrong targets.  
64 Michael Hatt, “The Subject of Hate Speech” (2000) 23:1 Oxford Art Journal 139-
146 at 142 (Dalhousie Online Libraries).   
65Moon, supra note 61 at 10. 
66Matsuda, supra note 49 at 33; Hare, supra note 4 at 146 & 171. Baker argues that 
regulation of public reasoning in some matters through dictation by the government 
as in the case of hate speech and giving liberty in others as in self-government goes 




3.2  Regulating Hate Speech to Promote Communal Good 
Those who want hate speech to be regulated include Steven J. Heyman. In his view, 
hate speech undermines the dignity and autonomy of its victims, and impedes 
enlightened intellectual discussion. It also creates an atmosphere of discrimination 
which militates against the very idea of communal harmony. To Heyman, just as 
governments have a responsibility to treat citizens with equality, individuals are 
also morally obliged to treat their fellow citizens with respect and dignity. 
Therefore, where certain forms of speech threaten to dissolve the fabric of society, 
governments are justified to control such propaganda and restore public order 
because they are elected by the people for this task.67 
Likewise, Meiklejohn contends that free speech does not mean that all ideas must be 
protected in a democratic society. Instead, freedom of expression is intended to 
protect those ideas which are conducive to the communal good. Since hate speech 
promotes discrimination and segregation in society, by definition, it cannot help 
people to reach decisions beneficial to the collective whole. He holds that the use of 
abusive language which creates hatred in society is not an aspect of democratic 
debate.68 Richard Moon also notes that “although expression sometimes increases 
knowledge and reflection, at other [times] it is disengaging of thought and reason, 
thus being hurtful and manipulative.”69 
                                                          
67Matsuda, Ibid at 172. 
68Ibid at 176. 
69Moon, supra note 61 at 31. 
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Others maintain that hate speech is usually directed towards groups that are 
already vulnerable or marginalized. Therefore, allowing hate speech requires 
individuals in these groups to tolerate what others do not have to, as the price of 
freedom of expression for all. On the contrary, Justice, equality and autonomy 
require that the burden of free speech must be the same for all those who enjoy the 
freedom, rather than be borne disproportionately by already victimized groups. 70 
In this respect, Alexander Tsesis asserts that maintaining social order and collective 
safety in society from unwanted assault (psychological or physical) is the real job 
for which governments are chosen. This, according to him, supersedes any claim of 
individual dignity by a person who employs hateful speech to satisfy his feelings of 
grudge, thereby poisoning the whole atmosphere of society.71 He notes that: 
 Self-assertion is not an absolute trump against egalitarian decision 
making…an autonomous right of lewd communication may sometimes be 
outweighed by well-defined contemporary community 
concerns...72[R]egulations against intimidating hate speech can reflect that 
governments have greater interests in preventing harmful expression than to 
exempt expression of menacing animus…73[A]s much as self-expression is 
fundamental to democratic institutions, it can, nevertheless, be balanced 
against social interest in safeguarding a pluralistic culture by preventing the 
instigation of demagogic threats. [Therefore] placing no limits on speech… 
preserves the right of speakers at the expense of targeted groups.74 
                                                          
70Matsuda, supra note 49 at 80; Richard Delgado et al, The Price We Pay: The Case 
against Racist Speech, Hate Propaganda, and Pornography (Hill and Wang 
Publishers, 1995) at 260. 
71Alexander Tsesis, “Dignity and Speech: The Regulation of Hate Speech in a 
Democracy” (2009) 44 Wake Forest Law Review at 501 (Dalhousie Online 
Libraries). 
72Ibid at 500. 
73Ibid at 503. 




Like these scholars, my view is that dignity does not only mean that a person must 
be respected in society by the state. It also denotes that other citizens must respect 
his individuality and freedoms. The correlative responsibility such an individual 
carries is whether his own expressions are in consonance with the idea of 
communal good.75Therefore, where government regulations promote collective 
harmony and social welfare, it is then legitimate. So long as hate speech upholds 
narrow cause of a hate group contrary to majority opinion, government regulation 
of the former is both necessary and justified. 
Peter Hogg rightly notes: “It is normally a sufficient moral or political justification 
for law that it is calculated to increase the general welfare. The law may make some 
people worse-off, but as long as these costs are outweighed by benefits to others, 
there is a net increase in the general welfare.”76 On this score, it is clear that though 
some regulation may harm a speaker, the overall benefit to the targeted group and 
society is much more important in a democratic society. 
Heyman agrees that where the benefits of regulation outweigh the injury caused to 
an individual in respect of his freedom of expression, such regulations (even though 
                                                          
75 Robert Mark Simpson, “Dignity, Harm and Hate Speech” (2013) Law and 
Philosophy 32-6 701-728 at 708 (SpringerLink). By communal good, I mean that 
benefit of the whole society should be given importance than protecting hateful 
expression of one which only satisfies such one person and is not in conformity with 
the underlying principles of free speech and democracy. 
76Peter W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada (Toronto: Carswell Publishers, 2009). 
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targeting a content-based expression) are justified on egalitarian grounds.77 
Similarly, Bhiku Parekh notes: “Although free speech is an important value, it is not 
the only one. Human dignity, equality, freedom to live without harassment and 
intimidation, social harmony, national unity and protection of one’s good name and 
honor are also central to the good life and deserve to be safeguarded.”78 Richard 
Moon and Caleb Young opine that although hate speech advances some interests 
and values, it poses a serious threat to the peace and tranquility of society at large. 
As such, it cannot be accorded protection.79 John Locke observes that an expression 
which denies equal rights to others ought to be dismissed. This is because the 
dignity, autonomy and freedom of an individual borrow their energy from similar 
rights that others must enjoy. 80 
In sum, to those who advocate regulating hate speech, freedom of expression is 
interactive. It does not have any more special importance compared to other 
constitutionally protected rights, such as dignity and equality. These rights take 
inspiration from each other and can be limited where they impinge upon each 
other’s integrity. In regard to an individual, therefore, these rights can be 
compromised where the collective welfare of the community is better served by 
restricting them. 
                                                          
77 Quoted in, Hare, supra note 4 at 160-163. 
78Parekh, supra note 53 at 216. 
79Moon, supra note 61; Caleb Yong, “Does Freedom of Speech Include Hate Speech?” 
(2011) 17:4 Res Publica 385-403 at 388 (Springer). 
80 Quoted in, Hare, Supra note 4. 
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3.2.A Keeping Hate Speech Unregulated? 
It was indicated earlier that arguments in support of non regulation are not fool 
proof. A number of these arguments are now assessed.  
In general, it is argued that since hate speech cannot be completely regulated, any 
effort to achieve this objective would fail. In contrast, others think that if regulation 
cannot completely control unlawful activity, it does not mean that the whole legal 
framework is unworkable for concentrating where it is effective. Laws in respect of 
crimes like murder, theft and rape do not fully control these crimes, yet their 
importance and workability cannot be denied. Therefore, criticizing hate speech 
laws on the basis of their ineffectiveness on some points is overstated criticism. 81 
Another criticism is that principles embodied in the provisions pertaining to hate 
speech protect the norms or values of a single group, those who most benefit from 
regulation. The reality, however, is that the protection offered by regulation benefits 
the whole society. Indeed, a civilized community requires a culture of mutual 
respect and tolerance, coupled with the protection of peaceful citizens from the 
injurious effects of hateful expressions. Such a community emerges only when 
people learn to respect and treat others in the same way they prefer to be treated. 
This is why, good hate speech laws that may not be fully effective are, at least an 
important step toward creating and sustaining such a society. Such laws help to 
                                                          
81Hare, supra note 4 at 173. 
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obviate an atmosphere of anarchy and vengeance which hate speech otherwise 
promotes.82 
Clearly, the argument that government regulation of hate speech suppresses free 
expression and damages truth is exaggerated. Rather, it is the untenable ideas of 
hate speech which adulterate clear reasoning with biased views. Left unchecked, 
hate speech takes on acceptability and legitimacy because it confuses by skewing 
truth in order to win hearts in the unregulated market place of ideas. 
Further, a regime of non-regulation will entail heavy social and individual costs. By 
natural logic, it is obvious that hate speakers will augment their hateful activities 
rather than stop them; after all, they are free to disseminate whatever hateful 
material they like. Such freedom also provides them a platform to instill the poison 
of their hatred into the very roots of society. This way, they contaminate the whole 
system with their false ideas and allure others to join them in promoting hatred as a 
true social value.  
To conclude, it must be pointed out that the assertion that people may be able to 
correctly see through prevalent false views in the absence of true ones has been 
sufficiently negated. Scholars have shown that there is plenty of reason to be 
skeptical of the reliability of public reason when exercised in particular 
social/economic contexts.83 In other words, people are less likely to find out truth 
where there is imbalance in favour of ideas in the market that resonate with their 
                                                          
82Ibid. 
83Moon, supra note 61 at 10. 
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own biases and interests. Therefore, if hate speech is unleashed for non-regulation, 
it would create a society based on ideals of hatred, and those false assertions will 
sabotage truth in a proportion far greater than the alleged adverse impacts of 
governmental regulation.84 
The succeeding sections consider the debate between non-regulation and regulation 
of hate speech around nine points of disagreement. The sections take them one after 
the other, and for each, the discussion assesses both positions supporting with 
supporting arguments and comes to a conclusion on the theme.  
4. Regulation of Hate Speech 
4.1 Is Hate Speech Politically Important Speech? 
Those who oppose regulation of hate speech think that it is a valuable form of 
expression because it challenges the status quo, and seeks to give awareness to the 
general populace on how to wisely choose political leaders, for instance.85 In other 
words, the argument is that hate speech initiates debate about issues of social 
discontent with the set objective to win adherents for the view point of hate 
speakers. In this view, the fact that hate speakers present values they consider 
acceptable to them gives their speech political status deserving of protection in a 
democratic society. 
                                                          
84Greenwalt, supra note 56 at 17-19. 
85W. J. Waluchow, Free Expression: Essays in Law and Philosophy (Clarendon Press, 
1994) at 153. 
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In contrast, authors like Alexander Tsesis argue that, “When harassing expression is 
disguised as political expression it adds nothing to democratic debate.”86 Richard 
Moon also notes that: 
Under established accounts of freedom of expression racist threats and 
insults may have some value, in as much as they express personal feelings or 
convey some kind of crude political view point. However, if we think that 
freedom of expression protects communicative relationship then we might 
also believe that a certain level of engagement with the audience is required 
before expression should be protected. The limited value of these acts must 
be weighed against the intended and significant injury to others… If words 
are threatening and harassing they may be unacceptable whether or not they 
cause the targeted individual to stop speaking.87 
 
Habermas and Heyman believe that speech is an individual right under the free 
speech principle, but political speech cannot trample all other equally important 
social interests. Further, freedom of speech means mutual recognition of respect 
and equality by all stakeholders in the public debate, while hate speech seeks 
intentionally to intimidate and dominate others, making it inimical to the ideals of 
social tolerance and peaceful co-existence.88 Essentially, these scholars argue that 
hate speech does not promote intellectual discourse as political expression; rather, 
it willfully promotes hatred in society. As such, it cannot be considered a form of 
political expression.89 
                                                          
86Tsesis, supra note 71 at 501. 
87Moon, supra note 61 at 128. 
88Quoted in, Hare, supra note 4 at 169-176. 
89Dworkin, supra note 58 at 202; Stefan Braun, Democracy Off Balance: Freedom of 
Expression and Hate Propaganda Law in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 2004) at 36. 
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Other critics argue that hate speech is not public discourse but private expression. 
They say so because hate speakers do not target a government but private social 
groups who become their victims. Consequently, governments do not regulate the 
expressions of their own political rivals, but operate as mediator between the two 
sides to ensure order in society.90 Given this, restrictions on hate speech can be 
justified, and, thus negate the idea that hate speech is politically important and 
deserves high protection.91 
4.2 Dangerous Implications of Governmental Regulation 
Some critics of regulation hold that although hate speech is inimical to society, it is 
more dangerous for principles of free speech and democratic values to place 
discretionary powers in the hands of government to criminalize expression.92 For, it 
would give the executive power to decide which speech is prohibited and which is 
not.93 Hence, their argument is that once a government is allowed to limit speech, it 
will widen its scope of regulation, bringing mere disagreement or even slightly 
offensive expressions within the ambit of proscribed speech. As a result, regulation 
even poses serious threat of censoring valuable scientific and artistic expressions.94 
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They also contend that if political speech is unpopular with government or critical of 
its policies, it would be declared prohibited. In this regard, it is noted that: 
The free speech principle must permit grotesque and nasty speech, because 
society in the domain of speech cannot be half-skeptical and half-infallible. 
We cannot infallibly choose the subjects that are legitimately debatable and 
those that are not. Once the boundary between the acceptable and the 
unacceptable is open for judicial scrutiny and legislative action, self-
interested groups will forever battle to legitimate censorship in one area 
after another.95 
Thus, they claim that these prohibitions on hate speech do not extend any clear 
guidance to speakers as to when their expression might be prohibited.96 For, “An 
attempt to micro surgically remove even small category of worthless speech from 
public discourse [would] seriously damage the vitality of the free expression crucial 
to democracy.”97 
4.3  Scope of Justified Governmental Regulations 
Those who support prohibition of hate speech argue that such prohibition conveys a 
clear message that promoting hatred is unacceptable, and protects those who are 
unable to speak for themselves. Criminal prohibition places the burden of opposing 
hate speech on the state, not the individual, because requiring the targeted 
individual to speak up could make them subject to more intimidation and violence.98 
Abraham S. Goldstein notes: 
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 [T]hose who see efforts to regulate group libel as taking us down a slippery 
slope to censorship pay too little attention to a second slippery slope…one 
which can produce a swift slide into a market place of ideas in which bad 
ideas flourish and good ones die [thus creating a discriminatory society].99  
Similarly, Stanely Fish notes “censoring politically incorrect speech will serve the 
instrumental purpose [of discovering truth and promoting individual and collective 
self-development] better than freedom will.”100 Thus, concerns about expression 
censorship can be dealt with through careful wording in the legislation. As well, the 
judiciary is quite capable of distinguishing between protected and unprotected 
expressions, as cases involving pornography or defamation demonstrate. Courts 
have devised sufficient censorship guidelines over the years which exclude only a 
specific kind of expression from the protection accorded to free speech. Canada is an 
example in this regard where, although a very extensive system of hate speech 
regulation operates, the importance of free speech has not been denied. Canada’s 
example reinforces the argument that if a law to proscribe only a particular category 
of speech is carefully designed to extend reasonable exceptions to eliminate the 
chances of misuse, then it may be justified in a democratic society. Such legislation 
cannot be seen as blindly sweeping down the slippery slope, because it would limit 
only a particular kind of expression without affecting other freedoms. It would also 
leave no unbridled discretionary powers in the hands of the government, courts, or 
the majority.101 Finally, the balance envisaged is expressed as follows: 
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The civil harm from unstopped spewing of hate justifies narrowly tailored 
regulation of speech so devoid of social utility. Requiring a showing of intent 
to promote destructive behaviour…[providing defenses, and provisions 
mitigating misuse of the law for false prosecutions] is a serious limitation on 
possible over breadth of the law.102 
Prohibiting hate deters those who are future hate mongers. Essentially, the fear of 
accountability lessens chances of hate speech coming into discussion more 
frequently, which leads to its reduction in society. For, when no one is willing to 
discuss a hateful idea, it becomes obsolete over time. 
4.4  Hate Speech vs. More Speech 
Opponents of regulation contend that instead of asking government to censor 
fundamental rights, targeted victims of hate speech should confront their 
antagonists with more speech. They argue that regulation of hate speech places 
power in the hands of authorities. The result is that victims of hate speech are 
oppressed, are unable to use their right to reply, and their self-esteem is damaged. 
For this reason, victims must counter argue, thus experiencing catharsis and 
develop self-reliance to take charge of their own destiny. Counter speech would also 
educate the ignorant hate speaker who may abstain from more of it. In brief, the 
view is that counter speech from the targeted victims may prove very fruitful for the 
democratic process, and must take precedence over legal prohibition.103 
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The problem with the foregoing argument, in my view, is that victims of hate speech 
are not able to reply because they are at a disadvantage regarding the power of 
communication in the market place of ideas. Further, those who have the limited 
opportunity to answer may be unwilling to risk their security with an enraged group 
of hate speaker. Therefore, I think that a clearly defined criminal provision with 
specific defenses can be enacted to narrowly target speech that promotes hatred. 
Such a provision would both respect freedom of expression (because it would be 
narrowly drawn and provide guidance for distinguishing between protected and 
prohibited speech), and reduce the harms caused by the promotion of hatred.104 
4.5  The ‘Deflection’ Argument 
Critics hold that prohibitions of hate speech divert peoples’ attention from other 
important issues in society, and that governments use such prohibitions to stifle 
criticism of prevalent social, political and economic issues. Hate speech is often seen 
as discontent toward certain groups that are considered to be the cause of all 
problems. Therefore, these critics argue that by suppressing hatred, governments 
suppress the voices that highlight socio-economic issues. They argue that the 
demand on government is to eliminate such issues which, in their view, occur due to 
the presence of certain groups in society. Hence, their demand is actually not 
directed against the people per-se. In this sense, hate speech becomes a category of 
political discourse. In sum, they argue that governments should address prevalent 
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socio-economic problems rather than focusing on promulgation of more speech 
prohibition laws if they are serious about eliminating hate within society.105 
Those who reject this argument claim that controlling hate speech is as important as 
improving socio-economic conditions. They claim that if left unmonitored, hateful 
feelings will transform into deeply rooted beliefs which would ultimately become 
causes of same socio-economic and political problems that the hate mongers are 
said to seek improvement for. These critics fear that a society based on 
discriminatory values would endorse the use of power and violence against 
identifiable groups who are seen as second class citizens. They point out, therefore, 
that those who belittle the value of regulation do no more than that draw attention 
away from its utilization as a valuable tool to ensure balanced debate and attention 
to social problems.106 
4.6  Is the Right to Free Speech More Special than other Equally Important 
Rights? 
Dworkin argues that fundamental rights protected by the constitution, for instance, 
the right to free speech will not be given preference or ‘taken seriously’ where a 
government keeps curtailing important liberties on which the system of democracy 
stands. He maintains that the right to free speech should not be curtailed as it is not 
in conflict with other rights, and rather, other rights depend on the protection of 
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freedom of expression for their existence.107 Thus, according to Dworkin, free 
speech is more special than other constitutionally protected rights that government 
absolutely must not be allowed to regulate.  
Proponents of regulation, in contrast, contend that an inherent conflict exists 
between the right to free speech and other rights, such as dignity, equality and 
religion. They acknowledge that it is a daunting challenge to find equilibrium 
between these two extremes, but that essentially, free speech is protected in the 
constitution just as other rights, and it has no special place. For this reason, speech 
must not be allowed when it encroaches into the territory of other rights. Therefore, 
it is reasonable to prohibit it when doing so brings greater collective benefits. 
4.7  Words are Deeds 
Proponents of regulation argue that hate speech can stimulate others to violence. As 
Richard Moon notes, “expression causes harm when someone is persuaded by a 
false idea or persuaded to act in a violent way towards another.”108 An example in 
this regard could be a situation where one speaker tries to speak but the other 
interrupts him with his words. 
It could be argued that words used in hate speech do not only have ostensible 
meanings, but they also depict what a speaker felt while using those words. A hate 
speaker may write an article using eloquent language to cover up his hateful 
sentiments and false assertions towards the targeted group. However, his words 
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must be seen as falling under the prohibited category of expression (after judging 
the context of his expression), since his readers or listeners might become violent by 
being motivated by the same grudge that he felt while using those words. For 
example, a speaker who is known for his criticism of Islam, saying that Islam is 
barbaric, and that the presence of Muslims in society is a continuous threat to peace 
because Islam promotes terrorism, is not just saying words, he is decrying the 
dignity of Muslims and inciting people to see Muslims negatively. Therefore, 
although no heinous words are spoken, the statement (if seen in the context of the 
speakers’ hostility against Muslims due to the distinctive characteristic of Islam) 
shows the anger of the speaker whose false assertions provide no proof that Islam 
promotes terrorism. Such statements may, nevertheless, inspire some people to act 
differently when they see a Muslim.109 In this case, the intention to motivate people 
to hate Islam and Muslims, although it may not promote direct violence, can lead to 
such events. Indeed, I agree that words are not just words (depicting ostensible 
meanings), but they carry hidden meanings that can influence others to perform the 
actions they imply. 
4.8  Law as Promoter of Hate Speech 
Some scholars argue that prohibiting hate speech will be counter-productive 
because it will enrage those who express hate and drive them to move from 
expression to violence. As well, prohibition will cause those prosecuted to be seen as 
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martyrs in the cause of protecting free speech, and this will possibly attract more 
adherents to the hateful ideas of the speaker.110 
Consequently, they hold that prohibitions of hate speech can only provide a short 
term remedy. A better strategy is to educate the public to reject hateful ideas. They 
note, “ while the courts and the Constitution establish legal dogma, one cannot 
overlook the overwhelming influence that the public has in constructing and 
establishing legal norms for society.”111 
Proponents of regulation argue that the message sent by criminalizing hate speech 
outweighs the martyrdom argument. In other words, while a few new adherents 
may be gained, more members of the public become educated to the harms. There is 
no evidence that people will have the wisdom to reject ideas that express hatred, 
especially where the public is mostly uneducated. Likewise, in addition to 
prohibition, other options such as education can be used to combat hatred. 112 
Proponents point out that speaking hate causes immediate harms and on a scale 
which requires an urgent response from the state. Therefore, when public rejection 
of hate speech is complied with governmental action in the shape of criminal 
regulation, victims are encouraged that the government is mindful of its duty to 
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prevent certain ideas, such as hate speech, which can endanger public peace and 
harmony.113 
4.9  Hate Speech and Harms: Is There a Causal Link? 
Critics of regulation argue that hate speech should not be prohibited unless it can be 
established that there is a causal connection between the expression and its 
consequential harm. They suggest that such causal connection must show an 
imminence of harm which requires an immediate response from the government. 
Such critics would maintain that regulation of hate speech merely on the basis of its 
tendency to harm ought not be allowed. They argue that “Speech is often 
provocative and challenging…[but it] is nevertheless protected against censorship 
or punishment, unless shown likely to produce[imminent harm] of a serious 
substantive evil that rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance or unrest.”114 
Judge Easterbrooke argues that there is no scientific evidence for a sound causal 
connection between hate speech and its alleged harms. He believes that lack of 
scientific evidence means hate regulations might be created on unreliable data. This 
makes it easier for the state to proscribe expression that it considers offensive or 
harmful. The challenge is ensure that freedom of expression is not censored on the 
basis of subjective and unproven notions.115 
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Critics also argue that mere offensiveness or outrageousness is not a sufficient 
criterion to warrant the use of legal prohibitions to limit an important right like 
freedom of speech. They contend that any expression can be held outrageous by any 
number of people because speech which is vulgar to one is freedom for another. 
Therefore, there must be more than offensiveness for speech to be censored by 
executive interference. Such an occasion, they say, may arise where danger is 
imminent and the government must act decisively to protect public good.116 
Supporters of regulation, like Mari Matsuda and Alexander Tsesis, contend that hate 
speech causes harm. Matsuda notes: “violence is a necessary and inevitable part of 
the structure of racism. It is the final solution…barely held at bay while the tactical 
weapons of…hate propaganda do their work.”117 Alexander Tsesis argues that 
although an imminent threat or harm may not occur in hate speech cases, yet with 
the passage of time, it promotes grudge and detestation in society, and such 
antagonism can devastate the whole social fabric when revealed.  Thus, he asserts 
that it is more important to control the long term harms of hate speech than to focus 
only on the immediate dangers.118 Bhiku Parekh observes: “Although the moral and 
psychic injury that [hate speech] can cause, and the restricted life chances to which 
it leads, are not easy to identify and measure, they can be profound and real.”119 
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Similarly, Jack Levin and Jack McDevitt argue that targets of hate speech fear 
violence, and have no way of placating those who hate them, even if they wished to 
so placate. Consequently, these victims avoid public places; become introverted and 
silenced; accept that their speech would not be taken seriously in society; believe 
that nowhere in society are they respected; lose self-esteem and a sense of personal 
security; feel humiliated, dehumanized, isolated and degraded. Furthermore, if 
government refuses to take action against hate speech, victims believe that even the 
state, which is the embodiment of society, has no respect for their personhood as 
valuable members of society.120 
As well, it is argued that this psychological strain can cause illness, including high 
blood pressure, hypertension, nightmares and post traumatic disorder.121 Further, 
the victim may not be able to concentrate or perform well at his place of work due to 
constant stress. Hence, some scholars are convinced that hate speech ought to be 
criminalized because of these consequent impacts on victims. These critics regard 
such regulations as ideals making it clear that this kind of obnoxious and 
contentious behavior should not be borne by society.122 
My conclusion is that though it is sometimes difficult to show a causal connection 
between hate speech and accrued harms, but it is a matter of common sense 
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fortified by judicial discussions that hate leads to violence and the most effective 
method of control is through penal regulation.123Both sides considered, I believe, 
regulation of hate speech is the preferable approach in all societies. Therefore, I 
present my final thoughts on the subject in the following concluding section of this 
chapter. 
5. Conclusion: Drawing the Line on Hate Regulation 
Some critics believe that prohibitions are a severe curtailment of the right to free 
speech because they compel speakers to express opinions on some issues while 
abstaining from discussing others. They hold that speakers must be free to express 
all kinds of ideas, for their expression cannot satisfy all listeners alike. Those who do 
not agree with an expressed statement would allege that the speaker is propagating 
hate. 
It is understandable that satire, academic work, etc., should remain protected from 
criminalization. However, there must be limitations where speech arises from 
hateful intentions that are rationalized. Those who willfully spread hate on the basis 
of religion, etc., should not be free to do so only because they use eloquent words to 
suppress their hidden hatred. If the work is based on hate toward a distinctive 
group, and this intention is quite apparent when the whole expression is examined 
in the context, then expression must be prohibited whether it is satire or academic 
research, etc.124 
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I agree that a genuine inquiry into an issue, even if some portion of it is offensive, 
must not be proscribed. It is possible that some scholars or group members might 
use hateful remarks only to prove their point more forcefully, but do not intend to 
create hatred.125 For example, a scholar when writing a paper on religious 
fanaticism, may include in it the arguments propounded by other scholars who 
claim that a particular religion is responsible for promoting extremism in its 
followers. In this situation, it is wrong to prosecute the author or speaker if only that 
section of text is taken as a basis for prosecution though he had no bad intention and 
that the words are not his own. Since the cumulative impression of his work or 
statements will convey a different intent, his expression must be seen in the context 
to judge whether it was to spread hatred or just to prove a point.  
In conclusion, I would reassert that a carefully designed criminal hate prohibition 
law will give freedom to expression made in good faith and in decent language. 
These provisions would permit expressions like satire, humor and disagreement, 
and would be invoked only when the limits of decency are crossed and violence is 
apparent in light of the cultural, historical legal and religious context of the society 
at hand. The law must also provide measures or supervisory mechanisms to control 
its misuse or abuse. It should not only control hate speakers but also those who may 
try to take the law into their own hands to promote extremism. 
Given this, it is appropriate to point out that Canada has gone through this hate 
debate and, having considered the arguments for and against regulation, has 
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decided to uphold criminal hate speech prohibitions. Further, it has succeeded in 
creating equilibrium between freedom of expression and censorship of hate speech, 
and, thus is a guiding model for countries that need to diminish hate and intolerance 
within their borders. A detailed discussion of how Canada dealt with hate speech 

















Canadian Legal Regime on Blasphemy and Hate Speech 
1. Introduction 
This chapter deals with laws relating to blasphemy and hate speech in Canada. The 
previous chapter argued that some regulation of hate speech is necessary, thus here 
I look into what type of regulation would be beneficial in carefully and narrowly 
controlling intentional hateful expression. In this respect, I discuss s.296 and s.319 
(2) of the Canadian Criminal Code, 1892126 which deal with blasphemy and hate 
speech respectively. Later, s. 14(1)(b) of the Saskatchewan Human Rights Code127 is 
presented so to understand Canada’s non-criminal law approach to the subject. 
Of these three possible models examined here, I conclude that the most appropriate 
for Pakistan is the hate speech model (s. 319) of the Canadian Criminal Code, 1892. I 
do not propose the human rights approach both because the criminal law is a more 
powerful tool for the state to prohibit and punish harmful behavior, and because 
Pakistan does not have in place legislation that parallels Canadian human rights 
codes or an administrative apparatus that parallels human rights commissions and 
tribunals.128 As between the two criminal provisions discussed here, I consider the 
hate speech approach more appropriate and effective than the blasphemy section 
296.  As set out below, Canada’s criminal provision on blasphemy significantly 
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impedes freedom of religion and so could not withstand a constitutional challenge 
today. As hinted in the first chapter, I consider blasphemy as a sub-set of hate 
speech, and argue that Pakistan’s criminal law on blasphemy must be modernized 
following s. 319 of the Canadian Criminal Code, 1892. 
Each of the models examined here does infringe freedom of expression, so before 
discussing whether any of these approaches can be upheld as a justifiable 
infringement of freedom of expression, I set out the approach taken in Canadian law 
where legislation is challenged on the grounds that it encroaches on a 
constitutionally entrenched right or freedom. 
2.  Stages of Charter Inquiry 
In 1982, Charter of Rights and Freedoms became part 1 of the Canadian constitution 
Act 1982. The Charter placed a significant limitation on Parliamentary supremacy in 
that a law can be challenged in the courts on the basis that it infringes a right or 
freedom set out in the Charter. If the court finds such an infringement, the 
legislation will be struck down unless the state can show (in accordance with s.1 of 
the Charter)129 that the infringement is demonstrably justifiable in a free and 
democratic society. Thus, the Charter is intended to protect certain rights and 
freedoms from unbridled discretionary power in executive authorities or in 
Parliament. The Charter has, however, been criticized for seeming to protect rights 
and freedoms on one hand, yet allowing the state to infringe those rights under s. 1, 
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and for vesting significant discretionary powers in the courts to subjectively 
determine which curtailment of rights will be allowed and which will not.130 
Proponents of section 1 contend that it works as a “neutral normative method by 
which to provide determinate guidance for the choice between individual freedom 
and collective control.”131Also, protecting certain rights and freedoms through 
constitutional entrenchment protects against an orthodox pro-majority regime, 
while s. 1 allows the state some flexibility in governing.  
Courts examine allegations of Charter infringements in two stages: (a) has a Charter 
right or freedom been encroached upon, and (b) if so, is that encroachment 
justified? So, in the examination of the Canadian Criminal Code provisions on 
blasphemy and hate speech, or a human rights code prohibition of hate speech, the 
first question would be whether the legislation infringed the constitutional 
protection guaranteed to free expression under section 2(b) of the Charter.  At this 
stage, the court will inquire into whether the behavior prohibited by the legislation 
is in fact expression, and thus covered by s. 2(b). Further, at this first stage, there 
may be a discussion as to whether the law is intended to limit freedom of 
expression, or whether that is simply the effect.  The guarantee provided under 
section 2(b) of the Charter has been interpreted very broadly, and the blasphemy 
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and hate speech provisions discussed here have been held to infringe freedom of 
expression.132 
Once a Charter right or freedom is found to have been restricted, the question then 
becomes whether the state can meet the requirements set out in s. section 1 of the 
Charter,133 which states: 
The Canadian ‘Charter of Rights and Freedoms’ guarantees the rights and 
freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by 
law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.134 
Thus the first stage of the Charter inquiry is to “identify cases for judicial review”135 
while the “determination of validity or invalidity of laws” happens at the second 
stage under section 1.136  Section 1 involves the courts in balancing protection of 
constitutionally protected rights and freedoms against other societal interests.137 
The Supreme Court of Canada has offered guidance in interpreting s. 1 of the 
Charter.  First, s. 1 requires that the restriction on the right or freedom must be 
“prescribed by law”, which means that the law being challenged “must provide 
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sufficient guidance for others to determine its meaning”. If the law is “so obscure as 
to be incapable of interpretation with any degree of precision”138then no further s. 1 
analysis will be required and the law will be held to be unconstitutional. While 
Charter rights and freedoms are not absolute, restrictions must be justified under s. 
1 and as a starting point, such restrictions must be sufficiently precise so that it is 
clear what specific activity is being targeted.139 
If the legislation being challenged meets the “prescribed by law” test, then the state 
must show that the restriction is a reasonable limit that can be demonstrably 
justified in a free and democratic society. In 1986, in the case of R. v. Oakes140, the 
Supreme Court of Canada set out a test that has been used ever since to determine 
whether or not challenged legislation passes the s. 1 test. 
2.1 Oakes Test of Proportionality 
2.1A. A Sufficiently Important Objective of Public Benefit 
Former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Canada, Dickson, observed in Oakes 141 
that a Charter guarantee can only be limited by the government if the impugned law 
is designed to achieve a “pressing and substantial” social objective.  This part of the 
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Oakes test is not difficult to pass; it would be very unusual for a court to find that 
legislation did not represent a pressing and substantial objective.  
2.1B. Rational Connection between the Objective and Means 
Next, the court asks whether the means employed by the government to achieve its 
claimed objectives are rationally connected to those objectives. Thus, it is possible 
that a court might declare the government’s method of carrying out its purpose as, 
for instance, over-broad in scope and unnecessarily prohibiting more activity than 
was required by the stated objectives;142 however, it is rare for the government to 
lose on this stage of the analysis too.143 
2.1C. Reasonably Minimal Impairment 
Third, courts require that the degree of impairment of the right or freedom in 
question is reasonable, given the government’s objectives; thus, the government 
must “demonstrate a reasonable basis that the means employed were the least 
drastic means possible.”144 This burden is quite high in criminal matters because 
there is so much at stake including a person’s reputation, time and most importantly 
liberty if he is ultimately convicted. On the other hand, where the objective is to 
achieve collective welfare, protect vulnerable groups or balance competing rights 
courts may be more deferential.145 
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A court cannot strike a law down simply because the court can imagine more 
effective or less damaging alternative means than those employed by the 
government for achieving its objectives.  Thus, perfection is not required and the 
state is given some margin of appreciation.146  In this regard, Gerald A. Beaudoin& 
Errol Mendes have noted that “Parliament has no obligation to choose the 
absolutely least intrusive means of meeting its objective. It is sufficient that 
Parliament has chosen from a range of means which infringe the Charter right as 
little as is reasonably possible.”147 
2.1D. Proportionality between Effects and Objectives 
At this stage of the s. 1 analysis, the court weighs the benefits and deleterious effects 
of the law that is being challenged. As one author states, “the object of the legislation 
ought to be that the incidents which [the law] tries to prevent are really evils… and 
that if evils they are greater than those [employed by the legislature to prevent such 
incidents].”148 Dickson C.J also noted that the “effects [of a legislation] must not so 
severely trench on individual or group rights that the legislative objective, albeit 
important, is nonetheless outweighed by the abridgment of rights.”149Until fairly 
recently, very little analysis actually took place at this final stage; in fact, Peter Hogg, 
an eminent constitutional scholar in Canada, had argued that this stage of the Oakes 
test was redundant because courts simply treated it as a mere rephrasing of the first 
                                                          
146Ibid at 854. 
147Mendes, supra note 131 at 202. 
148Braun, supra note 89 at 81. 
149Mendes, supra note 131 at 207. 
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stage which demanded a “pressing and substantial objective”. However, in 2009, in 
Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony150 the Supreme Court extensively discussed this 
fourth step, with the majority and dissent disagreeing strongly on how to weigh the 
positive and negative effects of the challenged legislation. After Hutterian Brethren, 
it seems likely that each step of the Oakes test will require full discussion and 
analysis when a law is challenged as breaching the Charter.  
With that as background, I now turn to a consideration of the Canadian criminal 
provisions on blasphemy and hate speech, and the hate speech provision of the 
Saskatchewan human rights code. 
3. Canadian Criminal Regime 
3.1 S. 296 Blasphemous Libel 
S. 296 of the Canadian Criminal Code (Code)151 prohibits blasphemous libel, stating: 
(1) Everyone who publishes a blasphemous libel is guilty of an indictable 
offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years. 
(2) It is a question of fact whether or not any matter that is published is a 
blasphemous libel. 
No person shall be convicted of an offence under this section for expressing 
in good faith and decent language, or attempting to establish by argument 
used in good faith and conveyed in decent language, an opinion on a religious 
subject. 
This section, introduced in 1892, has survived despite multiple revisions of the 
Criminal Code. However, there is little judicial commentary on the section, and it has 
not been used in Canada since 1935.152 
                                                          
150Alberta v Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, [2009] 2 S.C.R 567. 
151Criminal Code, supra note 2. 
152R v Rahard (1936), 65 CCC 344, 3 DLR 230 [Rahard]. 
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S.296 does not define blasphemy. However, one 1926153 blasphemy case offers the 
following definition: 
It is blasphemy to publish any profane words vilifying or ridiculing God, Jesus 
Christ, the Old or New Testament, or Christianity in general with intent to 
insult and shock believers or to pervert or mislead the ignorant or unwary. 
This intent is an essential element in the offence, though it may be presumed 
wherever such a result is the natural and necessary consequence of the 
publication. The defendant is not allowed to plead any justification or to 
argue at the trial that his blasphemous words are true.154 
Today, of course, the question would arise as to whether this definition would have 
to be extended to include vilification or ridicule of other religions as well. The case 
law indicates that blasphemy is not restricted to expressions scorning God only but 
also includes other aspects of religion like Holy Scriptures, sacred persons, and 
objects.155 In at least one case156 the judge attempted to make the distinction 
between opinions and particular expressions of those opinions, instructing the jury 
as follows: 
What you have to consider, gentlemen, is whether or not this publication is 
limited to the decency of proper controversy? [Sterry] is perfectly entitled to 
express his opinions so long as he does so in respectful and proper language 
that does not outrage your feelings and the feelings of the rest of the 
community.157 
                                                          
153R v Sterry, (1926) Quoted in Patrick, supra note 30 at 14. 
154 48 C.C.C 1 (Ont. C. A) (annotation only). 
155 Initially, R v. Kinler and the Golden Age (1925), 63 Que. C.S 483 (Qc. Supp.Ct) 
[Kinler] had decided that the offence of blasphemy only related to insults towards 
God, leaving aside all the other aspects of religion. However; in R v St Martin (1933), 
40 R de Jur 411 (QC CSP) [Martin] and R v Rahard (1936), 65 CCC 344, 3 DLR 230 
[Rahard] decided later, the broader approach outlined in the text above was taken. 
156Sterry, supra note 153. 
157Ibid at 15. 
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Interestingly, despite some judicial descriptions of blasphemy as offensive, heinous 
and capable of causing serious breach of peace, courts in Canada have awarded 
fairly nominal punishments in blasphemy cases.158 
As noted above, s. 296 has not been used since even before the advent of the 
Charter, and it is highly doubtful whether the section would survive a constitutional 
challenge in the present time. Clearly, the provision infringes freedom of expression, 
which is protected under s. 2(b) of the Charter, so the question is whether s. 296 
could pass the s. 1 Oakes test described above.  
Given the lack of definition, s. 296 is vague and overbroad, and so it would be 
difficult to argue that it infringes 2(b) of the Charter as minimally as possible, even if 
one takes into account the margin of appreciation discussed above.  Further, in 
today’s world, the government might find it difficult to maintain that the prohibition 
provides benefits which outweigh the clear encroachment on freedom of expression 
– particularly since the section has not been enforced for nearly 80 years.  Finally, 
some have noted that enforcement of blasphemy laws would require the state to 
become “the arbiter of religious dogma”159, which would violate not only freedom of 
                                                          
158 For instance, In R v. Pelletier and the Little Review (1901), 6 R.L. (n.s) 116 (Q.c.): 
the trial judge observed that “[t]hings most sacred have been turned into jokes; 
sarcasm appears in every sentence in a most impious and obscene form [the 
expression seems as the]…creation of a libertine mind and of a spoiled heart [and] 
can be understood only as the writing of a heathen espousing evil [which is]… 
capable of causing death of faith and of virtue” yet a nominal fine was imposed.  
159Rebecca Ross, “Blasphemy and the Modern, ‘Secular’ State” (2012) 17 Appeal 3-
19 Review of Current Law and Law Reform at 9-13 (Dalhousie Online Libraries). 
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expression but freedom of religion too. Concluding this, it is argued that blasphemy 
approach pursued in s.296 is not a prudent one to be adopted in modern societies. 
Next I demonstrate Canada’s criminal law provision on hate speech. 
3.2  S. 319 Willful Promotion of Hatred 
While the Canadian Criminal Code prohibition of blasphemous libel is vague and 
would likely be held to infringe freedom of expression unjustifiably, the hate 
speech provisions of the Criminal Code are much more precisely worded and have 
been upheld by the Supreme Court of Canada as a justifiable infringement of 
freedom of expression.160  It is argued here that the harms relating to blasphemy 
which the state could justifiably attempt to control are those aspects which 
resemble hate speech, and thus blasphemy should be treated as a sub-set of hate 
speech. Further, the argument of this thesis is that the approach taken in s. 319(2) 
offers a useful model for modernizing Pakistan’s laws on blasphemy as hate 
speech.  
The need for prohibitions on hate speech in Canada is described in a Library of 
Parliament report as follows: 
 The distribution of hate propaganda and the activities of racist groups have 
come [in Canada] in two waves since the 1960s. In the middle of that decade, 
anti-Jewish and anti-black hate propaganda was widespread in Canada, but 
                                                          
160People may think that Canada is a country free from hatred based on 
characteristics such as race or religion, but unfortunately this is not the case. 
Historically, black slaves were brought from Africa and exported to Canada’s 
southern neighbor (U.S) in large numbers during the 17th and 18th century as a 
lucrative business. Likewise, hatred against Jews, Muslims, Chinese, Japanese, East 
Indians etc., is still to some extent common in Canada; Errol P. Mendes & Stephane 
Beaulac, Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 4thed (LexisNexis, 2005). 
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especially in Ontario and Quebec. Simultaneously, neo-Nazi and white 
supremacist groups, based largely in the U.S., became active in Canada.161 
As a result, the federal government appointed a committee chaired by Maxwell 
Cohen, a McGill professor and Dean of Law to investigate the problem of hate 
propaganda in Canada.162 
The committee released its report in 1966 and noted that: 
There exists in Canada a small number of persons and a somewhat larger 
number of organizations, extreme in method and dedicated to the preaching 
and speaking of hatred and contempt against certain identifiable minority 
groups in Canada.163 
And that: 
However small the actors may be in number, the individuals and groups 
promoting hate in Canada constitute a clear and present danger to the 
functioning of a democratic society. For, in times of social stress, such hate 
could mushroom into a real and monstrous threat to our way of life… In the 
committee’s view, the hate situation in Canada although not alarming clearly 
is serious enough to require action. It is far better for Canadians to come 
grips with the problem now, before it attains unmanageable proportions, 
rather than deal with it at some future date in an atmosphere of urgency, of 
fear and perhaps even of crises.164 
As a result of the Cohen Committee’s recommendations, sections 318-320 were 
added to the Criminal Code, 1892 in 1970. 
S. 319 states as follows: 
                                                          
161Philip Rosen, “Hate Propaganda” Library of Parliament (24 January 2000), online: 
The Parliament of Canada < 
http://www.parl.gc.ca/Content/LOP/researchpublications/856-e.htm>. 
162Mendes, supra note 131 at 1415-1416. 
163Waluchow, supra note 85 at 172; Minister of Justice Canada, Report to the Minister 
of Justice  of the Special Committee on Hate Propaganda in Canada, (Cohen 
Committee), Queens Printer, Ottawa, 1966. 
164Dworkin, supra note 58 at 13. 
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319. (1) Everyone who, by communicating statements in any public place, 
incites hatred against any identifiable group where such incitement is likely 
to lead to a breach of the peace is guilty of 
(a) an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for a term not 
exceeding two years; or 
(b) an offence punishable on summary conviction. 
(2) Everyone who, by communicating statements, other than in private 
conversation, willfully promotes hatred against any identifiable group is 
guilty of 
(a) an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for a term not 
exceeding two years; or 
(b) an offence punishable on summary conviction. 
(3) No person shall be convicted of an offence under subsection (2) 
(a) if he establishes that the statements communicated were true; 
(b) if, in good faith, he expressed or attempted to establish by argument an 
opinion on a religious subject; 
(c) if the statements were relevant to any subject of public interest, the 
discussion of which was for the public benefit, and if on reasonable 
grounds he believed them to be true; or 
(d) if, in good faith, he intended to point out, for the purpose of removal, 
matters producing or tending to produce feelings of hatred toward an 
identifiable group in Canada. 
According to the Library of Parliament report referred to above, a second wave of 
hate propaganda erupted in Canada in the 1970s, this time with a broader range of 
targets: “Hate propaganda was not only anti-Jewish and anti-black, it was also anti-
East Indian, anti-Catholic, anti-French and anti-Native people”. 165 This new wave of 
hate propaganda brought a number of prosecutions; in the most famous of these, R v 
Keegstra, [1990] 3 SCR 697.The Supreme Court of Canada upheld s. 319(2) as a 
                                                          




justifiable limit on freedom of expression. This case is discussed in some detail 
below. 
3.2.A R. v. Keegstra (1990)166 
Mr. Keegstra taught social studies to 9th and 10th grade students in Alberta. His 
teaching was highly anti-Semitic; he described Jews as sadistic, money loving, power 
hungry, child killers, whose sole objective was to control the world. Further, he 
blamed Jews for economic depressions, anarchy, chaos and wars worldwide, and 
claimed that reports of the Holocaust had been concocted to win sympathy. 
Students in Mr. Keegstra’s classes were required to reproduce these views if they 
wished to get good marks. Consequently, Mr. Keegstra was charged with the willful 
promotion of hatred against Jews under section 319. Mr. Keegstra defended his 
teaching as based on sincerely held interpretations of Christian theology and 
contended that far from being discriminatory, his teachings enriched public 
intellect.167He further argued that s. 319(2) was overly broad, would require a very 
subjective assessment of what might offend or disturb, and had a serious chilling 
effect on freedom of expression, which should not be compromised on a mere 
likelihood of its’ potential to injure feelings of some class of people.168 Thus, Mr. 
                                                          
166Keegstra, supra note 123. 
167Louis Greenspan & Cyril Levitt, Under the Shadow of Weimar: Democracy, Law and 
Racial Incitement in Six Countries (Praeger, 1993) at155-156. 
168Waluchow, supra note 85 at 207. 
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Keegstra argued that section 319(2) violated his freedom of expression, and could 
not be saved under s. 1 of the Charter.   
 His arguments were dismissed by the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench, but the 
Alberta Court of Appeal held in his favour holding s. 319(2) to be unconstitutional, 
on the grounds that it was overly broad stating that: 
[a]lthough the deliberate expression of lies is not protected by s 2(b) of the 
Charter, s 319(2) also criminalizes innocent or negligent expression of 
falsehood, and it is this feature which violates freedom of expression.169 
At the Supreme Court of Canada, all seven justices hearing the appeal agreed that s. 
319 infringed freedom of expression, and then split 4-3 as to whether the 
infringement could be justified under s. 1.  Dickson CJ, writing for the majority, 
concluded fairly quickly that s. 2(b) was breached, but within his s. 1 analysis, 
indicated (as discussed below) that hate propaganda lay at the fringes of what is 
protected by the Charter guarantee of freedom of expression.   
In contrast, McLachlin J (as she then was), writing for the dissent, spent significant 
time discussing the theoretical underpinnings of protection for free expression 
before moving to the s, 1 analysis.  While McLachlin J acknowledged that:  
[h]ate literature presents a great challenge to our conceptions about the 
value of free expression [and]… often constitutes a direct attack on many of 
the other principles that are cherished by our society. 170 
She characterized  
[a]ttempts to confine the guarantee of free expression only to content which 
is judged to possess redeeming value or to accord with the accepted values 
strike at the very essence of the value of the freedom, reducing the realm of 
                                                          
169Mendes, supra note 131 at 1420 & 1421. 
170Keegstra, supranote 123.  
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protection to that which is comfortable and compatible with current 
conceptions.171 
Moving to the s, 1 analysis, the majority and dissent agreed that s. 319 met the first 
stage of the test, having a pressing and substantial objective. Dickson CJ described 
hate propaganda as both harming the targeted group, and “creat[ing] serious 
discord between various cultural groups in society”172 and, with references to the 
Cohen Committee referred to above and international human rights instruments, 
concluding that combating such harms was a pressing and substantial objective. 
McLachlin J agreed that attempting to prevent the promotion of hatred against 
vulnerable groups and attempting to protect social harmony were “laudable goals 
and serious ones”.173 
Dickson CJ also saw the importance of the objective as bolstered by the protection of 
equality and multiculturalism in the Charter.174Thus, the majority relied on 
rationales set in Zundel175 and Taylorcase where the courts remarked that “freedom 
of expression must necessarily have regard to the corresponding rights and 
freedoms of other persons”.176By contrast, McLachlin J opposed the notion of using 
                                                          
171Ibid at para 87. 
172Ibid at para 32. 
173Ibid at para 104. 
174Ibid at para 38. 
175Canada Human Rights Commission v Taylor, [1990] 3 SCR 892 [Taylor].The 
rationale of protecting communal good rather than one hate speaker’s right to self-
realization, whose expression is disconnected from the underlying principles of 
democracy such as seeking of truth, furtherance of democracy etc., was given 
priority in Zundel and Taylor case by the majority of the Supreme Court. 
176 R v Zundel, [1992] 2 SCR 731, SCJ No 70. 
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Charter guarantees for equality and multiculturalism to narrow the protection 
offered by s. 2(b).177 
Dickson CJ began his consideration of the proportionality aspect of the Oakes test by 
noting that, in his view, hate propaganda “is of limited importance when measured 
against free expression values”,178 given that it: 
contributes little to the aspirations of Canadians or Canada in either the 
quest for truth the promotion of individual self-development or the 
protection and fostering of a vibrant democracy where the participation of all 
individuals is accepted and encouraged.179 
Dickson CJ found that s. 319 (2) met the rational connection test from Oakes.  
Recognizing that it is often difficult to gauge precisely the effects of legislation, 
Dickson CJ held that the approach taken in s. 319 was “rational in both theory and 
operation.180McLachlin J concluded differently, saying that courts must look beyond 
Parliament’s intentions, and consider the actual effects of challenged legislation and 
that “it is far from clear that it [s. 319] provides an effective way of curbing hate-
mongers”.181 
At the minimal impairment stage of the inquiry, Dickson CJ considered the argument 
that s. 319 was overbroad such that it ran the risk of criminalizing expression that 
did not relate to the objective of protecting against hate propaganda, or so vague 
                                                          
177Keegstra, supra note 123 at 83-84. 
178Ibid at Para 41. 
179Ibid at para 43. 
180Ibid at Para 46. 
181Ibid atpara 94. 
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that its meaning could not accurately be determined.  Dickson CJ expressed these 
arguments as follows: 
The question to be answered then is whether s. 319 indeed fails to 
distinguish below low value expression that is squarely within the focus of 
Parliament’s valid objective and that which does not invoke the need for the 
severe response of criminal sanction.182 
Dickson CJ responded to arguments regarding over-breadth and vagueness by 
noting that the section excluded private conversations, mandated that the 
promotion of hatred must be willful, required that the expression be aimed at 
particular groups rather than simply an individual, used the language of hatred, 
which in Dickson CJ’s view meant “a most extreme emotion that belies reason”183 
and provided defenses relating to “good faith or honest belief”.184 Dickson CJ saw 
these elements as sufficiently narrowing and defining the offence. Further, 
Parliament is permitted to use a variety of methods to further government 
objectives, so the fact that hate propaganda could also be targeted through human 
rights legislation did not automatically mean that a criminal prohibition was not 
also justifiable. Ultimately therefore, Dickson concluded that s. 319 met the minimal 
impairment test. 
McLachlin J, was of the view that s. 319 might be overly broad. She construed the term 
hatred more broadly than did Dickson and noted with concern that the section does 
not require the proof of “actual harm or incitement to hatred”.185 However, McLachlin 
                                                          
182Ibid atpara 46. 
183Ibid atpara 49. 
184Ibid atpara 50. 
185Ibid atpara 96. 
66 
 
J hesitated to characterize arguments based on the wording of s. 319 as 
“constitutionally determinative”,186 given the fact that the section also provided 
defenses. Instead, she looked to the section’s “track record” concluding that “it has 
provoked many questionable actions on the part of the authorities”.187 Further, 
McLachlin J was of the view that other, non-criminal approaches might be more 
appropriate. For these reasons, she concluded that s. 319 did not meet the minimal 
impairment test. 
In weighing the positive and negative effects of the section, Dickson simply balanced 
the fact that hate propaganda is “only tenuously connected with the values 
underlying the guarantee of freedom of speech” against “the enormous importance 
of the objective fueling s. 319”.188McLachlin J, on the other hand, saw s. 319 as 
constituting a serious restriction on freedom of expression which was not, in her 
view, counter-balanced with evidence of any real benefits. 
Critics of the majority position in Keegstra have adopted many of the arguments of 
the dissent, arguing that there is social science evidence which supports the 
assumption that criminalizing hate speech will protect vulnerable groups from 
hatred. Some have argued that: 
fears or concerns of mischief which may occur are not adequate reasons for 
imposing a limitation. There should be actual demonstration of harm or a 
real likelihood of harm to a society’s value before limitations can be said to 
be justified.189 
                                                          
186Ibid atpara 96. 
187Ibid atpara 98. 
188Ibid at para55. 
189 Mendes, supra note 131 at 184-185. 
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However, for reasons more fully explored in chapter 2, I find the majority approach 
in Keegstra more compelling, and I am of the view that a carefully defined, narrowly 
drawn criminal prohibition on hate speech which also provides the kinds of 
defenses available in s. 319 is a justifiable restriction of freedom of expression. It is 
for this reason that I see s. 319 as a useful model for modernizing Pakistan’s 
blasphemy laws. 
4. Human Rights Regimes in Canada 
In Canada, each province and territory, as well as the federal government has passed 
human rights legislation. These Acts prohibit discrimination based on certain 
protected grounds, in sectors such as employment, the rental of residential premises 
and the provision of services to the public. Protected grounds include quite a 
number of characteristics, including race, religion, gender, sexual orientation and 
marital status. While processes vary slightly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, a fairly 
common approach is as follows: where a person believes that he or she has been 
discriminated against in contravention of the applicable human rights act, the 
person can make a complaint to the Human Rights Commission, appointed under 
the Act. The Commission will investigate and if it appears that discrimination has 
taken place, attempt to reach a settlement between the parties. Where this is not 
possible, the matter will go to a human rights tribunal, which is appointed to hear 
the complaint, decide if it is substantiated, and if so, choose from the range of 
remedies available in the Act. Remedies could include issuing an apology, paying 
compensation, re-instatement in the context of employment or making public 
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services more accessible. The informal and inexpensive remedies used by the 
tribunal include conciliation, mediation and arbitration, with the sole purpose to 
compensate victims. Thus, human rights commissions and tribunals are part of the 
administrative state, rather than the criminal justice system. A defendant who 
defaults in compliance of a tribunal order may be subject to contempt of court 
proceeding which could lead to imprisonment; however, this rarely occurs.190 
Until recently, the federal Human Rights Act contained a section prohibiting  
a person or a group of persons acting in concert to communicate 
telephonically … any matter that is likely to expose a person or persons to 
hatred or contempt by reason of the fact that that person or those persons 
are identifiable on the basis of a prohibited ground of discrimination.191 
However, this section was repealed in 2013, to take effect in 2014,192 despite the 
fact that the section had been upheld by the Supreme Court of Canada as a justifiable 
                                                          
190Canadian Human Rights Act, RSC 1985, c H-6. 
191Ibid : 13. (1) It is a discriminatory practice for a person or a group of persons 
acting in concert to communicate telephonically or to cause to be so 
communicated, repeatedly, in whole or in part by means of the facilities of a 
telecommunication undertaking within the legislative authority of Parliament, any 
matter that is likely to expose a person or persons to hatred or contempt by reason 
of the fact that that person or those persons are identifiable on the basis of a 
prohibited ground of discrimination. 
(2) For greater certainty, subsection (1) applies in respect of a matter that is 
communicated by means of a computer or a group of interconnected or related 
computers, including the Internet, or any similar means of communication, but 
does not apply in respect of a matter that is communicated in whole or in part by 
means of the facilities of a broadcasting undertaking. 
(3) For the purposes of this section, no owner or operator of a telecommunication 
undertaking communicates or causes to be communicated any matter described in 
subsection (1) by reason only that the facilities of a telecommunication 
undertaking owned or operated by that person are used by other persons for the 
transmission of that matter. 
192 [Repealed, 2013, c.37, s.2]. 
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infringement of freedom of expression.193The opposition parties were not in favour 
of the repeal and it could be speculation that a changed government might lead to a 
re-instatement of the section in June 2015.  
In the meantime (along with the section 319 regime mentioned above), a number of 
provincial human rights codes in Canada contain hate speech provisions. One of 
these, s. 14 of the Saskatchewan code,194 was recently challenged as 
unconstitutional. In Whatcott,195 the Supreme Court upheld a slightly modified 
version of the section, as a justified infringement of freedom of expression.  
At the time of the challenge, s. 14 read as follows: 
14(1) No person shall publish or display, or cause or permit to be published 
or displayed, on any lands or premises or in a newspaper, through a 
television or radio broadcasting station or any other broadcasting device, or 
in any printed matter or publication or by means of any other medium that 
the person owns, controls, distributes or sells, any representation, including 
any notice, sign, symbol, emblem, article, statement or other representation: 
(a) tending or likely to tend to deprive, abridge or otherwise restrict the 
enjoyment by any person or class of persons, on the basis of a prohibited 
ground, of any right to which that person or class of persons is entitled under 
law; or 
(b) that exposes or tends to expose to hatred, ridicules, belittles or otherwise 
affronts the dignity of any person or class of persons on the basis of a 
prohibited ground. 
(2) Nothing in subsection (1) restricts the right to freedom of expression 
under the law upon any subject. 
                                                          
193Taylor, supra note 175. 
194Code, supra note 126. 
195Saskatchewan (Human Rights Commission) v Whatcott, 2013 SCC 11, [2013] 1 SCR 
467,  
Rothstein J [Whatcott]. 
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4.1A Whatcott v. Saskatchewan Human Rights Commission  
A complaint was laid against Mr. William Whatcott under section 14(1)(b) for 
publishing and distributing four flyers in Saskatoon and Regina.196 Out of those four 
flyers, two were titled as “Keep Homosexuality out of Saskatoon’s Public Schools” 
and “Sodomites in our Public Schools.” The remaining two were reprints of an 
advertisement to which the respondent had added written comments.197Four 
individuals who received the flyers at their homes filed complaints to the 
Saskatchewan Human Rights Commission alleging that Mr. Whatcott’s publications 
“promoted hatred against individuals because of their sexual orientation.”198 
The tribunal agreed with the claimants that the flyers promoted hatred, and ordered 
the respondent to refrain from publishing any such material in future.  The tribunal 
also directed him to pay $2500 to one complainant while the remaining three 
claimants were to receive $5000 each as compensation.199The tribunal also found 
the section to be constitutional.  On appeal, the Saskatchewan Court of Queen’s 
Bench upheld the tribunal’s decision, observing that section 14(1)(b) only 
prohibited “communication that involves extreme feelings and strong emotions of 
detestations, calumny and vilification.”200The Court of Appeal also found s. 14 to be 
                                                          
196Code, supra note 126. 
197Whatcott, supra note 195 at para 8. 
198Ibid at para 9. 
199Ibid atpara 11. 
200Ibid at para 13;Taylor, supra note 175 at para 21. 
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constitutional, but held that the flyers distributed by Mr. Whatcott did not violate 
the section. The Saskatchewan Court of Appeal held that:  
the Tribunal and Court of Queen’s Bench had both failed to balance the 
limitation on freedom of expression in section 14(1)(b) with the 
confirmation of the importance of expression set out in section 14(2).”201 
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, the Court considered whether s. 14 
infringed freedom of expression and freedom of religion.  Rothstein J, writing for a 
unanimous court, stated that “This Court’s approach in Keegstra and Taylor, with 
some modification, sets out an acceptable method for determining how to balance 
the competing rights and interests at play.”202 
With regard to the argument of that the section allowed for too great subjectivity, 
the Court noted that the Act required the application of the reasonable person 
standard, and referred to Dickson J’s discussion of hatred in Taylor. Rothstein J 
stated that 
“detestation” and “vilification” aptly describe the harmful effect that the Code 
seeks to eliminate.  Representations that expose a target group to detestation 
tend to inspire enmity and extreme ill-will against them, which goes beyond 
mere disdain or dislike. Representations vilifying a person or group will seek 
to abuse, denigrate or delegitimize them, to render them lawless, dangerous, 
unworthy or unacceptable in the eyes of the audience.  Expression exposing 
vulnerable groups to detestation and vilification goes far beyond merely 
discrediting, humiliating or offending the victims.203 
In response to arguments that the section was overly broad, Rothstein J stated: 
In applying hate prohibitions, courts must assess whether the impugned 
expression is likely to expose a protected group to hatred and potentially 
lead to the activity that the legislature seeks to eliminate. This ties the 
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analysis to the legislative purpose and works to prevent the prohibition from 
capturing more expressive activity than is necessary to achieve that 
objective.204 
Thirdly, tribunals hearing complaints under s. 14 “must focus their analysis on the 
effect of the expression at issue”.205 
Having set out its understanding of how hatred was to be construed in this context, 
the Court then turned its attention to the constitutionality of s. 14(1)(b). Only one 
paragraph was devoted to the s. 2(b) discussion. The impugned section was found to 
violate freedom of expression, and the real focus of the decision was on whether or 
not this infringement could be justified under s. 1.  
The Court had no difficulty determining that s. 14(1)(b) was enacted in furtherance 
of the pressing and substantial objective of reducing discrimination.  Since hate 
speech “seeks to delegitimize group members in the eyes of the 
majority”characterizing them “as blameworthy or undeserving”, this ultimately 
makes it “easier to justify discriminatory treatment.206 
Mr. Whatcott contended that the impugned provision was not rationally connected 
to the objective of preventing hate speech in the society, arguing that no reliable 
socio- scientific evidence or data showed either that hate speech produces harms or 
that s. 14(1)(b) prevented hate speech.207 The Supreme Court remarked that 
immediate empirical evidence cannot be produced in hate speech cases as it is 
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generally possible in other crimes. But, incidents of hate crimes in society are much 
rampant rather increasing every day, thus it might be hasty to assume that the 
provisions pertaining to hate speech are ineffectual or that hate inflicts damage on 
no one. Therefore, it is not an exaggeration to claim that these laws are justified 
rationally because they “remind Canadians of their fundamental commitment to 
equality of opportunity and the eradication of intolerance.”208 
On rational connection, the Court held that protecting individuals from emotional 
harm is not the appropriate test; instead  
the focus must be on the likely effect of the hate speech on how individuals 
external to the group might reconsider the social standing of the group. 
Ultimately, it is the need to protect the societal standing of vulnerable groups 
that is the objective of legislation restricting hate speech.209 
S. 14(1)(b) largely reflected this societal approach, and also focused on the targeting 
of individuals because of their membership in a particular group. However, the 
references to “ridicules”, “belittles” or “affronts the dignity of” inappropriately 
focused on subjective feelings, and thus were unconstitutional as they were not 
rationally connected to the objective of eliminating discrimination. These words 
were therefore severed from the section.210 With this modification, Rothstein J also 
held that the section did not fail for being overly broad.211 
On minimal impairment, Rothstein J examined two alternatives proposed for 
combating the kind of speech targeted in s. 14. The first of these was the 
                                                          
208Ibidat para 98. 
209Ibidat para 82. 
210Ibidat para 94. 
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“marketplace of ideas”; while Rothstein J did not reject this approach nor did he see 
it as precluding governmental action, citing Keegstra’s warning not to “overplay the 
view that rationality will overcome all falsehoods in the unregulated marketplace of 
ideas”.212 The second proposed alternative was that the criminal law should be used 
to sanction speech that advocates or justifies violence or where actual harm is 
shown. Rothstein J was not convinced that any one of these alternatives was so 
clearly superior as to make the human rights approach unreasonable. Further, civil 
law remedies provided under s 14(1)(b) had a remedial purpose, were less 
intrusive than criminalization, and provided an inexpensive way of accessing justice 
for disadvantaged groups. Thus, the Court concluded that as compared to the 
proposed alternative means of regulation s.14 minimally impaired free speech.213 
In terms of the nature of the expression being protected, the Court relied upon 
Dickson C.J’s observation in Keegstra that: 
Hate propaganda contributes little to the aspirations of Canadians or Canada 
in either the quest for truth, the promotion of individual self-development, or 
the protection and fostering of a vibrant democracy where the participation 
of all individuals is accepted and encouraged. While I cannot conclude that 
hate propaganda deserves only marginal protection under the s. 1 analysis, I 
can take cognizance of the fact that limitations upon hate propaganda are 
directed at a special category of expression which strays some distance from 
the spirit of s 2(b), and hence conclude that restrictions on expression of this 
kind might be easier to justify than other infringements of s. 2(b).214 
Having concluded that s. 14(1)(b) met the minimal impairment test set out in Oakes, 
the Court then moved to the last step in the Oakes analysis, asking whether the 
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benefits of the challenged section outweighed its deleterious effects. The prime 
objective of human rights legislation is to compensate victim instead of punishing 
respondents, so it promotes the modes of settlement through mediation and 
conciliation techniques.215 
Ultimately therefore, the Supreme Court found that s. 14(1)(b) was a justifiable 
restriction on freedom of expression. 
5. Conclusion 
To summarize, I regard s. 319 of the Canadian Criminal Code as the most 
appropriate model for modernizing Pakistan’s blasphemy laws. Section 319 is 
narrowly designed, has proper defenses and cannot be invoked without permission 
from the Attorney General. This seriously curtails the potential for the kinds of 
misuses described in the next chapter on Pakistan’s blasphemy laws.  While s. 319 
does infringe freedom of religion and expression, I agree with the analysis of the 
Supreme Court of Canada that such an infringement is justifiable. Once hate speech 
provisions are added to the criminal law in Pakistan, the current overly broad 
blasphemy section could be repealed.  I do not propose the human rights approach 
because Pakistan does not have human rights legislation or administrative bodies to 
enforce such legislation. Arguably too, the human rights approach might still be 
open to misuse through unfounded complaints of the sort described in the following 
chapter. However, while I do not advocate the human rights approach, the 
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discussion of the Supreme Court of Canada in cases such as Taylor and Whatcott 
reinforces the argument that some limitation on freedom of expression is justifiable 



















Blasphemy in Islam and the Draconian Nature of Pakistan’s Blasphemy Laws 
1.  Introduction 
This chapter analyzes the current law on blasphemy in Pakistan, and offers 
suggestions for reform based on the Canadian criminal law approach to hate speech 
provided under section 319(2) of the Canadian Criminal Code (Code), as discussed in 
the previous chapter. The chapter presents a historical snapshot of blasphemy laws 
in Pakistan. It discusses the relationship between blasphemy and Shariah. Further, it 
categorizes some cases on blasphemy to give context to how the law is being used in 
Pakistan. It sheds light on a) incidents of social fanaticism as a response to 
blasphemy; b) incidents of harshness and broadness of the law; and c) cases in 
which the accused was acquitted at the Appellate stage, but the case still illustrates 
ways in which the law can be manipulated and misused. 
2. History of Pakistan’s Blasphemy Laws 
Before the takeover by Britain in 1857, the undivided India had been frequently 
under attack from various warriors since Alexander the Great. However, the Great 
Mughals ruled India for the longest period in Indian history.216 They considered 
India as their second home. One Mughal emperor named Akbar, who ruled in the 
                                                          
216Descendents of Genghis Khan who ruled India for five centuries. They were not 
from the sub-continent but had adapted the lifestyle and culture of this highly 
enigmatic place ‘India’. They spent extensive treasures in promoting India’s culture 
and building palaces, fortresses, mosques and other buildings that are still famous 
historical attractions for many people.  
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15th century A.D, became the most famous among them. He introduced a modified 
and reformed version of Islam to which he gave the title ‘Deen-I- Ilahi.’  This new 
form of religion emphasized the principles of tolerance and equality among all 
Indian citizens. Therefore, we find almost no examples of prosecution for the crime 
of blasphemy in his era.217 
 Aurangzeb Alamgir, another Mughal ruler who was the grandson of Akbar, 
introduced purely an Islamic way of life in India when he ascended to throne.He and 
his successors were not inclined to develop a harsh and orthodox Islamic society, so 
very few records of any prosecutions for the offence of blasphemy are available in 
their period.218 
When Britain assumed supremacy over India, it suspended the Islamic legal regime 
and monarchy, considering them to be undemocratic. In reality, the treatment 
meted out by the British to Indians over the next century was much harsher than 
that faced during the royal monarchies. The British introduced their own laws in 
India to control and improve public order and peace.219 One example was the 
introduction of blasphemy laws intended to control communal clashes between 
Muslims and Hindus living under English control.220In the light of one such incident, 
a famous blasphemy case titled “Raj Pal vs. the Emperor”221  was heard in 1927, in 
                                                          
217 Mohammad Nafees et al, “Blasphemy Laws in Pakistan: A Historical Overview” 
(2012) Center for Research and Security Studies (Report). 
218Ibid at 4. 
219Ibid at  9. 
220Ibid at14-15. 
221Raj Paul v Emperor (1927), [1927] A.I.R Lahore 590. 
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response to the publication of blasphemous material by a Hindu writer against 
prophet Muhammad (P.B.U.H). Muslims initiated prosecution against the Hindu 
writer under section 153-A of the Indian Penal Code (IPC).222 The provision read as 
follow:  
Indian Penal Code, Section 153A: Promoting enmity between different groups on 
grounds of religion, race, place of birth, residence, language, etc., and doing acts 




(a) by words, either spoken or written, or by signs or by visible 
representations or otherwise, promotes or attempts to promote, on grounds 
of religion, race, place of birth, residence, language, caste or community or 
any other ground whatsoever, disharmony or feelings of enmity, hatred or ill-
will between different religious, racial, language or regional groups or castes 
or communities…shall be punished with imprisonment which may extend to 
five years and shall also be liable to fine 
 
The trial judge held that the main objective of section 153-A IPC was to prevent 
public disorder triggered by religious hatred and discrimination, and not to prohibit 
blasphemous attacks on sacred religious personages which might hurt the feelings 
of a particular class or religion. Therefore, the accused was acquittedand the need 
for stronger blasphemy laws was felt in India.223 
                                                          
222Indian Penal Code, 1860, Act No. 45, s 153-A. 
223Raj Paul, supra note 221; In consequence of this greater need for blasphemy laws 
in India, the following provision was enacted: 
Whoever, with deliberate and malicious intention of outraging the religious 
feelings of any class of His Majesty’s subjects, by words, either spoken or 
written, or by visible representations, insults or attempts to insult the 
religion or the religious beliefs of that class, shall be punished with 
imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two 




3. Transition of Pakistan from Secularism to Islamization 
3.1 From Iqbal to Jinnah: A Secularist Vision 
Fundamentalists believe that the pioneer Muslim society of the times of Mohammad 
(P.B.U.H) is the most suitable model for an ideal society today. Hence, they demand 
that current political regimes following westernized laws in Muslim countries be 
reformed or overthrown to bring those systems in accordance with the injunctions 
of Shariah. Thus, their goal is to make Islam the political, social and economic 
ideology of Muslim states.224 
In contrast, a majority of Muslim scholars believe that Shariah is a guiding source, 
but it cannot be interpreted in such a way as to reshape the whole constitutional 
and legal structure of a state. Further, they hold that it is impossible to implement 
laws which were prevalent in the society of Prophet (P.B.U.H) 1400 years ago, 
because societies have gone through a major transformation since then. Thus, 
Shariah must be applied in a modernized way, keeping in view the needs and 
realities of present times. These scholars contend that implementing the orthodox 
structure of Shariah rigidly in modern societies would allow for misinterpretation 
and abuse of law, thus risking significant social damage.225 
For instance, Muhammad Iqbal, a great Muslim poet and philosopher of the 20th 
century, was known as ‘Poet of the East’ among the youth of his time owing to his 
                                                          
224 Tahir Wasti, The Application of Islamic Criminal Law in Pakistan: Sharia in 
Practice (BRILL, 2008) at 3; Ron E. Hassener, “Blasphemy and Violence” (2011) 55:1 
International Studies Quarterly 23-45 at 28 (Wiley Online Library). 
225Wasti, Ibid at 30. 
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motivational poems. He did his doctorate in philosophy from Munich, Germany, and 
was the one who dreamt of a new Muslim state in the Indian subcontinent. 
Unfortunately, he died before the creation of Pakistan in 1938, but this great thinker 
made a remarkable contribution to the struggle for Pakistan by convincing 
Muhammad Ali Jinnah226  in 1930 to help in realizing his dream of a separate 
Muslim state. 
Iqbal dedicated his whole life to the enlightenment and encouragement of Muslim 
youth to achieve knowledge, hoping to create a class of young intellectuals who 
would understand and support Islamic reforms. He believed that certain provisions 
of Shariah were limited to the time, conditions and traditions of Arabs a thousand 
years ago, so those could not be considered binding for future generations of 
Muslims.  Therefore, he argued that Muslims needed to seek guidance from Islamic 
principles, but they should adopt a dynamic approach in their application, keeping 
in view the needs of the modern age instead of being orthodox and conservative.227 
Likewise, Muhammad Ali Jinnah remarked in 1947: 
You are free; you are free to go to your temples, you are free to go to your 
mosques or to any other place of worship in the state of Pakistan. You may 
belong to any religion or caste or creed— that has nothing to do with the 
business of the state…Now I think we should keep that in front of us as our 
ideal and you will find that in course of time Hindus would cease to be 
Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense, 
                                                          
226 Also known as Quaid-e-Azam (the great leader), he was a renowned barrister 
from Lincoln’s Inn, England who politically fought for Muslim independence from 
the British during 1900-1947. 
227 David F. Forte, “Apostasy and Blasphemy in Pakistan” (1994) 10 Connecticut 
Journal of International Law 27 at 29 (Hein Online).  
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because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense 
as citizens of the state of Pakistan.228 
Given Jinnah’s views, I strongly agree with Keith Callards’ observation that Pakistan 
was intended to be a secular state. The independence movement was led by those 
who were educated under the western school of thought. However, the ideal of a 
secular state has been totally hijacked by the fundamentalists in today’s Pakistan, 
who consider the enlightened founding fathers enemies of Islam owing to their 
secular outlook.229 
However, Jinnah’s view was ignored by the majority of the constituent assembly of 
Pakistan when it passed the “objectives resolution” in 1949 to be described below. 
Similarly, after the sad demise in 1948 of Muhammad Ali Jinnah, his dream of 
making Pakistan a secular country died with him, and fundamentalists emerged on 
the political scene to disseminate the view that Pakistan was made in the name of 
Islam. They claimed that the implementation of an Islamic way of life was the only 
refuge from the ordeals experienced by the new nation since its independence in 
1947. 
Essentially, the introduction of the “Objectives Resolution” marked the introduction 
of an orthodox mindset in the country, under the pretext of islamization.  This is so 
because, despite objections by minority members and some Muslim members of the 
assembly, the resolution was ultimately passed. Focal points of the resolution 
included: the sovereignty of God Almighty was acknowledged while giving power to 
                                                          
228 Quoted in Siddique, supra note 30 at 317.  
229Wasti, supra note 224 at 6. 
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the people as a sacred trust to be exercised by their chosen representatives; existing 
laws were to be brought in conformity with the injunctions of Shariah and any law 
repugnant to them was to be declared null and void; non-Muslims  would not be 
eligible to be appointed as the prime minister of the state; and the state was to 
enable Muslims to order their lives in accordance with Islamic teachings.230 The 
Objective Resolution was, therefore, a notable event in the constitutional history of 
Pakistan, as it established religion as the dominant force in state affairs. It was 
criticized because non-Muslim members had no idea what sovereignty of Allah and 
living life according to Islamic principles meant, neither were they adequately 
consulted. However, succeeding constitutions of the country had the “Objective 
Resolution” as an integral part, and have transformed Pakistan’s outlook from the 
one it was originally meant to have.231 
3.2 The Zia Regime and the Death of a Secular State: Manipulation of Islam to 
Legitimize Dictatorship 
General Zia-ul-Huq, played the most negative role in making Pakistan a radical 
country. He was appointed as Chief of Army Staff by the then Prime Minister, Mr. 
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, by superseding eight Senior Lieutenant Generals. However, Zia-
ul-Huq eventually became the President of Pakistan himself through a military coup 
                                                          
230Ibid at 6-7; Bilal Hayee, “Blasphemy Laws and Pakistan’s Human Rights 
Obligations” (2012) UNDAU Law Review 3 at 28(AustLii).;Forte, supra note 224 at 
31. 
231 The Objectives Resolution remained as an important guiding beacon for the 
constitutions of Pakistan in1956 and 1962. But, most notably, it was adopted as a 
preamble in the constitution of 1973 which finally made it a substantive part of the 
Constitution of Paksitan. 
84 
 
which ousted Bhutto’s regime in the late 1970s.232 When Zia-ul-Huq assumed office 
of the Chief Martial Law Administrator in 1977, he stated that he had no political 
motives at all, and that he considered it his duty as a ‘soldier of Islam’ to oversee the 
peaceful transfer of power to a democratically elected government. He also showed 
his resolve to introduce Islamic system in the country by stating that since Pakistan 
was attained in the name of Islam, so its survival depends upon its commitment to 
Islam.   
He believed that the political parties were un-Islamic because they promoted 
sectarianism, so he proposed himself as a reformer, ultimately assuming power as 
President of the state. This was the beginning of a new era consisting of eleven long 
years of despotism and autocracy throughout which Zia-ul-Huq strenuously tried to 
consolidate more and more power in the office of the President. During this period, 
the country emerged as a major Western ally in combat between Afghanistan and 
Russia, and Zia, along with the U.S, promoted Jihadist fundamentalists in the region.  
On the pretext that Muslims follow one God and one Book, he ordered that there 
should be only one office or leader having ultimate power in the state (a President). 
                                                          
232This was an action that Mr. Bhutto must have regretted later because Zia-ul-Huq 
got Bhutto sentenced to death in a false murder accusation. It is ridiculous indeed 
that Pakistani leadership did not learn from this mistake despite being acquainted 
with the horrific repercussions of such actions. I am saying this because in the year 
1999, another prime minister of the country Mr. Nawaz Sharif who is also the 
current prime minister of Pakistan, and has been selected so for the 3rd time, 
repeated the same mistake by appointing Pervez  Musharraf, General (Rtd.)  as the 
Chief of Army Staff by superseding other senior generals. The result was, again, 
much the same because Musharraf took over the reign of the country through 
another military coup. The country is entangled in the war against terror, and has 
become the center of worldwide attention since then. 
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Likewise, he compelled judges of the superior courts through a Provincial 
Constitutional Order (PCO) to take an oath of allegiance to his government. The 
judges who did not comply had to resign, while those who did concede to his orders 
were influenced to declare favorable judgments supporting his regime.  
In 1979, Zia temporarily empowered Provincial Appellate Courts to the extent that 
they could declare any law void if it was found repugnant to the injunctions of Islam 
as laid down in the Holy Quran and Sunnah of the Holy Prophet (P.B.U.H). Next, he 
established a Federal Shariah Court to examine and decide whether any provision or 
law was repugnant to the injunctions of Islam, and instituted a separate Shariah 
Appellate Bench within the Supreme Court of Pakistan. The Shariah Appellate Bench 
consisted of three Muslim judges of the Supreme Court and two so-called Islamic 
scholars (Ulemas).233 Zia appointed his favourite judges in the Federal Shariah Court 
and Shariah Appellate Bench of the Supreme Court and tried to further curtail the 
powers of the other Appellate Courts. But Zia’s appointees were not experts in 
Islam, so they pronounced numerous faulty judgments declaring many Islamic legal 
provisions and punishments as un-Islamic. Protests begun and Zia had to appoint 
Ulemas’ with orthodox approaches as judges of the Court to secure his regime.  
Zia also introduced Hudood laws through a presidential ordinance in 1979, thus 
implementing very harsh punishments for crimes like adultery, drinking and 
theft.234 Furthermore, he initiated sectarianism and hatred among different faction 
                                                          
233 A person considered to be well versed in Islamic teachings. 
234‘Hudood’ means limits of conduct ordained by God in Sharia and specifically 
mentioned in the Holy Quran. If someone breaks these fixed limits, he commits a 
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of Pakistani society by favoring certain religious identities, coming close to getting 
Shias’ declared as non-Muslims because of their way of practicing religion.235 
Despite his earlier statements against sectarianism, Zia was the strongest promoter 
of it.  
In 1984, Zia placed restriction on Ahmadis, who in 1974 were declared non-
Muslims, but were free to practice their religion as they pleased.236 However, Zia 
forbid Ahmadis from professing their creed publicly along with many other 
restrictions making the violations as punishable, thus severely curtailing freedom of 
religion in Pakistan as laid down under Article-20 of the Constitution.237 
                                                          
crime for which fixed punishment of ‘Hadd’ has been expressly stated. Some 
examples include, amputation for theft, whipping for alcoholism and stoning/ 
whipping in case of adultery etc. 
235These are a sect of Muslims who follow Quran and Sunnah (the life of Prophet 
P.B.U.H) in just the same way as all the Muslims do. They believe in all the ideals and 
principles of Islam as ordained by God through His Messenger in true spirit. But, the 
only difference lies in the way they practice religion which at some occasions does 
not conform to the prevalent practice in Pakistan; National Legislative Bodies/ 
National Authorities, Pakistan: Ordinance No. VII, offence of Zina (Enforcement of 
Hudood) Ordinance, 1979 (10 February 1979), Online: 
refworld<http://www.refworld.org/docid/4db999952.html>. 
236These are a sect of Muslims who follow Mirza Ghullam Ahmed. He was a man in 
1940’s who proclaimed that he was Jesus Christ the Prophet of God. He was, in 
reality, a spy paid by the British government who had maliciously tried to take 
advantage of the the Muslim belief that Jesus Christ would be resurrected before the 
Day of Judgment.  Consequently, he became successful in winning at least some 
adherents who are known as Ahmadi’s and considered infidels in Pakistan. 
237The Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 10 April 1973, Ch 1, Art 20:  
Article 20-Freedom to Profess Religion and to manage religious institutions 
Subject to law, public order and morality— 




This review of the history of Zia’s regime clearly shows that his claim of Islamization 
was not more than a drama which he enacted to give legitimacy to his unjust rule as 
a usurper and despot. He left no stone unturned to grab more and more power on 
the pretext of Islamization and even did not shun from using the judiciary to gain 
political benefits, as those judges pronounced faulty judgments by introducing un-
Islamic punishments in Pakistan.  
This is the background in which the current blasphemy law section 295-C of the 
Pakistan Penal Code (PPC) was introduced. The provision reads. 
Section 295-c Pakistan Penal Code 1860: 
Whoever by words either spoken or written, or by visible representation, or 
by any imputation, innuendo or insinuation directly or indirectly, defiles the 
sacred name of the Holy Prophet Muhammad (P.B.U.H) shall be punished 
with death, and shall also be liable to fine. 
 S 295-C (PPC) contains many patent defects of form and procedure, which are 
exacerbated by current social and political milieu of Pakistan. Further, it has 
extensive textual lacunas coupled with imposing very harsh punishments which are 
indeed not warranted by Islam. Finally, as one writer puts it “These laws, in their 
current form, have caused, and continue to cause, several miscarriages of justice and 
are a stimulus for strengthening the negative and highly divisive forces of 
intolerance and fanaticism in the Pakistani society.”238 Therefore, in my view, it is 
clear that blasphemy law section 295-C is indeed not religiously motivated, thus 
                                                          
(b) every religious denomination and every sect thereof shall have the right 
to establish, maintain and manage its religious institutions.  
238Siddique, supra note 30 at 305-306. 
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justifying the emotional and uncompromising attachment of its adherents. But, in 
reality it is a product of political objectives of a certain mindset, and, thus must be 
adjudged on this criterion alone. In this regard, I present a criticism of the 
blasphemy law of Pakistan below. The aim is to depict some practical examples of 
their misuse through a brief overview of famous blasphemy cases.  
4. Contours of Problem: a Snapshot of Some Controversial Blasphemy 
Incidents in Pakistan 
The incidents discussed below show how blasphemy is seen in Pakistan, and how 
the law is used for false prosecutions. In this regard, it is important to mention that 
during the whole period of turmoil and disturbance between 1857-1947 when the 
undivided India was entangled in huge communal clashes, only seven cases of 
blasphemy were reported. This number rose to 80 during Zia’s regime from 1977-
1988. However, it reached a shocking number of 247 cases which were recorded 
from 1989 to 2012. In addition, around 435 people have been prosecuted since 
1990, while as many as 50 have lost their lives in extrajudicial murders by religious 
fanatics.239 These unfortunate victims include men, women and children of all ages 
belonging to different religions, faiths, sects, creeds, and ethnicities. Even mentally 
ill, physically impaired or illiterate persons have not been spared in this regard. 
Further, this is the story of only those cases which have been recorded but there are 
numerous other unrecorded cases affecting the lives of many innocent people. 
                                                          
239Nafees, supra note 217. 
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Below are some anecdotes of religious fanaticism which is out-rightly un-Islamic, 
unjustified and illegal yet practiced in Pakistan. 
4.1  Personal Stories 
In 1991, Naimat Ahmar, a Christian school teacher in a village near Faisalabad,240  
was accused of committing blasphemy by pasting posters on a wall which were 
derogatory towards Prophet Mohammad (P.B.U.H). He denied these allegations, but 
still apologized unconditionally for any emotional harm that this incident had 
created among Muslims. He was constrained to leave his job and flee to a nearby city 
due to threats by fanatics. However, during police investigations, it came to light 
that he was maliciously implicated in a false case by a rival candidate jealously 
aspiring for his teaching position. So finally, he was acquitted of the charge leveled 
against him. But unfortunately, a year later, a religious fanatic named Ahmad 
stabbed him at least 17 times to death for a crime Naimat had never committed. His 
killer did not leave the crime scene and confessed before the police that he had 
committed murder out of his religious obligations to kill a blasphemer.  
Aggravating the agony and grief of the family of the victim, the murderer was kissed 
by policemen for his courage, devotion and commitment to Islam. Clerics 
congratulated him for the blessings and rewards in the hereafter for this lofty deed. 
Likewise, many legal professionals offered free representation to Ahmed for his 
pious act of killing a blasphemer, while rejecting to represent heirs of the victim. 
                                                          
240 A city in the central part of the province of Punjab, Pakistan. 
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Last but not the least, police made every effort to spoil the case of the prosecution 
by not gathering potential evidence and using delaying tactics.241 
Similarly, in 2005, Dr. Younas Sheikh, an eminent scholar in Pakistan, was sentenced 
to death on a charge of blasphemy by the Sessions Court242 in Islamabad for 
statements he made during a lecture delivered to his students in the university. The 
allegation was that he said, “Prophet Muhammad (P.B.U.H) was a non-Muslim until 
the age of forty; until the age of forty his armpit and pubic hairs were not removed; 
his first marriage contract was not solemnized since he was married at the age of 
twenty five; and that his parents were non-Muslims, since they died when he was 
only a child.”243 The Appellate Court, on the other hand, exonerated him thus 
observing therein that those statements had been delivered without any malicious 
intent to hurt religious feelings of the students just as a response to the questions on 
pre-Islamic Arab traditions. Therefore, the accused had committed no blasphemy. 
On another occasion in 2011, Salman Taseer244 and Shahbaz Bhatti245  were 
murdered by religious fanatics because they had spoken in support of a Christian 
                                                          
241 Based on the narrative in Forte, supra note 227 at 60-64.  
242 A court of original jurisdiction 
243  Akbar S. Ahmed, “Pakistan’s Blasphemy Law: Words Fail Me” The Washington 
Post (19 May 2002), online: The Washington Post  
<http://www.wright-house.com/religions/islam/pakistan-blasphemy-law.html>. 
244 A former Governor of the province of Punjab, Paksitan who was killed by his own 
security guard. Taseer had just said that the blasphemy law needs to be amended 
because of its inherent defects. 
245 A federal minister for minority affairs in Benazir Bhutto’s government who had 




woman named Asia Naureen who was sentenced to death on a charge of blasphemy. 
They both had validly argued that the blasphemy law was full of vagueness, thus 
creating a vast room for its misuse. Their lives were taken because they had shown 
courage to criticize these laws. Both of them were themselves considered 
blasphemers as well, according to complaints made by religious fundamentalists.  
Another teenage Christian girl named Rimsha was accused of blasphemy in 2012.  
She was alleged by a cleric to have burned pages of the Holy Quran near Islamabad, 
the capital city of Pakistan. As a result, a frenzied mob of Muslims attacked the 
Christian community living in that area, and forced them to flee. Rimsha was 
arrested by police the same day the complaint was registered, and the case was 
investigated. During investigation, it was revealed that the cleric had concocted a 
false story just to gain the area occupied by the Christian community for the purpose 
of constructing a mosque. Next I discuss court cases relevant to blasphemy in 
Pakistan. 
4.2      Court Cases 
4.2A.  Sarfaraz Ahmaed vs. the State (1992)246 
A marriage invitation card became the bone of contention in this case. It was alleged 
that the said card contained blasphemous material against the Holy Prophet 
Muhammad (P.B.U.H) although not in a direct but in an implied sense. The number 
of accused persons was six, one woman and five men.  
                                                          
246Sarfraz Ahmad v State, [1992] P.Cr.L.J 2346, Akhtar J [Sarfraz].  
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The prosecution contended that the accused/appellants were Ahmadis’ by faith who 
believed in the false claim of a person named Mirza Ghullam Ahmad as a prophet of 
God equal in status to Prophet Muhammad (P.B.U.H). The said card had a specific 
Arabic prayer ‘Durood’ written on it which is commonly used by Muslims as a 
blessing of God Almighty exclusively for Prophet Muhammad (P.B.U.H). Thus, it was 
asserted that the said blessing or prayer was meant for Mirza Ghullam Ahmad since 
the sender was an Ahmadi by faith. Essentially, it was alleged to be an effort to 
degrade the holy name of Prophet Muhammad (PB.U.H) by the accused persons.   
The Attorney General representing the prosecution argued that Mirza Ghullam 
Ahmad was a false claimant of prophet-hood, since Islam has explicitly pronounced 
that Muhammad (P.B.U.H) is the last prophet of God.  In this perspective, the 
Ahmadis’ were declared as non-Muslims through a parliamentary amendment since 
they follow a false claim which is repugnant to the injunctions of Islam and openly 
violate the teachings of Shariah. As a result, their use of ‘Durood’ clearly shows that 
it was not meant for the Prophet of Islam (P.B.U.H) but for Mirza. So it was 
considered blasphemous, attracting the application of section 295-C of Pakistan 
Penal Code, 1860 (PPC).247 
Contrarily, the counsel for appellants submitted affidavits of at least two men 
deposing on oath that they were true Muslims and considered Mirza as a liar. 
However, when the remaining three accused-appellants were subjected to cross 
examination, they were reluctant to expressly denounce Mirza, the false claimant of 
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prophet-hood. This fact raised serious doubts in the mind of the Court regarding 
their assertions as to being true Muslims. To conclude, the Court in its judgment 
held that since Ahmadis’ have been declared as non-Muslims according to Article 
260(3) (b) of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, so the 
‘Durood’ written on the said invitation card by them was meant for their false 
prophet, which amounts to degrading the respectful name of Prophet Muhammad 
(P.B.U.H), thus attracting the penal provision under section 295-C PPC. 
Consequently, the Court granted bail to two of the accused persons on the basis of 
their affidavits that they were true Muslims. The one accused woman was also 
granted bail due to her women-hood. But, the bail applications of the remaining two 
accused/petitioners were denied because they had not renounced their affiliation 
with Mirza and they were sentenced to death.248 
4.2B. Salamat Masih vs. the State (1995)249 
In this case the allegation of committing blasphemy under section 295-C PPC was 
leveled against a thirteen year old Christian boy named Salamat along with two 
others namely Rahmat and Manzoor who were his middle aged relatives in 1993.250 
A cleric of a local mosque filed the complaint, alleging that he, along with other 
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witnesses, had seen the accused persons writing derogatory remarks against the 
holy prophet (P.B.U.H) with broken pieces of bricks on the wall of the mosque. It 
was also alleged that similar offensive remarks were found written on the walls of 
toilets in the said mosque, but the identity of those who wrote the same was 
unknown. The complainant also produced some papers in evidence which contained 
insulting statements written in pen concerning the personality of Prophet 
Muhammad (P.B.U.H). He asserted that he had found those pages from the mosque a 
year before the registration of the instant case. The prosecution produced four 
witnesses who deposed before the Court that they tried to apprehend the accused 
persons when they were writing the blasphemous remarks on the wall of the said 
mosque, but they fled, taking advantage of the darkness of night. Thereafter the 
complainants and other eye witnesses of the locality immediately removed the 
insulting statements.  
Resultantly, a criminal case under section 295-C PPC, 1860 was registered against 
the accused persons at the local police station in Gujranwala251 The case was later 
shifted to Sessions Court in Lahore252 for trial because the accused persons were 
receiving death threats. However, during trial in 1994, the accused were attacked by 
gunmen outside the Court when they were brought for hearing. As a result of that 
murderous assault, one of the accused, Manzoor, lost his life on the spot. The other 
two, namely Salamat and Rahmat, were severely injured. Adding pain to grief, the 
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Court out of sheer disregard of the demands of justice, showing cowardice, 
incompetence, negligence and feeling threatened by the impending violence, 
sentenced them to death without fully appraising the available evidence.  
The trial Court sent a reference to the High Court/Appellate Court for confirmation 
of the death sentence. However, the Appellate Court, after examining the evidence in 
detail, found numerous legal and factual defects in the case, so it refused to confirm 
the sentence and acquitted both accused persons. The Court noted that the 
complainant who was the star witness for the prosecution had retracted his 
previous statement during trial, thus becoming a hostile witness. So it was unfair for 
the trial Court to have relied on his testimony to convict the accused persons. 
Likewise, the complainant claimed to have kept the handwritten papers containing 
blasphemous remarks with him for a year prior to the said incident of blasphemy 
which he provided to the investigating officer only two days after the said case was 
registered. This sole fact spoke aloud about the quality of evidence available against 
the accused persons in terms of legality and admissibility. Neither the investigation 
agency nor the trial Court ever bothered to have taken at least the handwriting 
samples of the accused persons to be matched with the one on the alleged papers to 
reach the truth or veracity of the allegations, but still the trial Court was pleased to 
convict and sentence the accused persons to capital punishment. 
Three witnesses gave statements that were inconsistent and contradictory to each 
other. One witness deposed that he had only seen Salamat accused of writing the 
blasphemous remarks on the wall, while the other two accused were only standing 
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behind him keeping watch. On the other hand, the other two witnesses deposed that 
they had seen all the accused persons simultaneously writing blasphemous remarks, 
which sarcastically, consisted of just four to five words in all. Therefore, the 
Appellate Court showed great displeasure over the attitude of the trial Court for 
relying on a mere ocular account which was not only inconsistent but also devoid of 
any sort of independent corroboration, in a case pertaining to such a grave charge 
and severe sentence which of course requires a very potent evidentiary basis for 
initiating prosecution against someone. 
In addition, it was established in evidence that all the accused persons were 
illiterate. Besides this, all of them lived in the same village situated about one and a 
half miles away from the place of occurrence and they were all arrested from their 
homes on the same day. The Appellate Court observed that if three persons were 
simultaneously writing on the wall, then it is unnatural to assume that they wrote 
just three or four words in total. Likewise, it was observed that if other people in the 
locality had gathered there at the time of the incident and helped to remove 
derogatory remarks from the wall, then why was none of those individuals ever 
produced by the prosecution as a witness in the court.  
Given this, after a detailed appreciation of evidence, the Appellate Court came to the 
conclusion that the prosecution had miserably failed to prove the case against the 
accused persons beyond any shadow of doubt, so it directed the acquittal of both 
accused persons while setting aside the impugned judgment. The Court vehemently 
criticized the trial court for pronouncing the death sentence on such flimsy grounds, 
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holding that the prosecution could not prove its case at all. Finally, the Court 
ordered an immediate release of the convicts/appellants in the face of enraged and 
charged processions of religious fanatics.  
Meanwhile both Salamat and Rahmat were offered political asylum by Germany and 
were compelled to leave their homeland reluctantly just for the protection of their 
family in future. Counsel for the accused, a famous human rights lawyer in Pakistan, 
Asma Jahangir, was attacked by religious fundamentalists for supporting the alleged 
blasphemers. Lastly, Mr. Justice Iqbal Bhatti, the retired Judge of the Appellate 
Court, was murdered when he was sitting in his law chamber in 1997. He 
continuously received death threats from the religious fanatics after he acquitted 
Salamat and Rahmat. 
4.2. C Muhammad Mahboob vs. the State (2002)253 
In this case, a Muslim man was convicted by the trial court for pasting hand written 
derogatory posters on the wall of a mosque. Those posters contained false 
accusations about the holy prophet Muhammad (P.B.U.H) claiming that he had illicit 
relationships with young boys and women, thus defiling his sacred name attracting 
the penal provision under section 295-C of PPC, 1860. The police had collected a 
writing sample of the accused during investigation which became the basis of 
conviction during trial, since the ink of that sample matched with the one on the 
posters in forensic examination. As a result of this incriminating evidence and ocular 
                                                          




statements by witnesses, the accused was convicted. He was sentenced to death 
under section 295-C PPC, and a fine of 50,000 Pakistani rupees was also imposed on 
him. 
He appealed to the Appellate Court which observed that the ocular evidence of 
witnesses was full of discrepancies and contradictions, so it was unreliable and 
insufficient to prove the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court 
also noted that the complainant was barely literate as he had only passed high 
school. Besides this, he did not possess even sufficient knowledge of Islam. He was 
also a quack and posed himself as a homeopathic doctor but he could not produce 
his degree to prove this fact in evidence. Furthermore, there were serious lacunas 
and contradictions in the statement of the prosecution witnesses since they 
frequently resorted to dishonest improvements to what they said. 
 For instance, when the complainant appeared as witness, he deposed that the 
accused never offered prayers in the mosque where the alleged posters were found.  
On the other hand, the second witness claimed that the accused regularly offered 
prayers in the said mosque. Likewise, it was argued by the third witness during 
examination that many other people from the vicinity had seen the accused when he 
was pasting the alleged posters on the wall of the said mosque. However, no such 
person from the vicinity ever appeared before the court to verify or corroborate this 
story.  
The accused pleaded that he was falsely implicated by the police in connivance with 
the complainant only on account of his different religious beliefs. He was maliciously 
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prosecuted because he followed a religious school of thought different from that of 
the complainant. The accused also raised objections regarding the credibility of the 
handwriting sample produced by police in evidence, claiming that he was subjected 
to torture by police who compelled him to write on a blank paper with the markers 
given by them. These were the same markers with which the alleged posters were 
written, hence the ink matched in both specimens during forensic examination.  
The court observed that the extra-judicial confession of the accused before police 
was inadmissible in evidence. Likewise, the doubtful nature of evidence relating to 
writing samples coupled with the lack of religious knowledge on the part of 
investigating officer and witnesses greatly influenced the mind of the court to 
remark as “such quality of evidence could not be relied upon in a case as serious as 
the present one, and, thus reflected inefficiency, inaptitude, apathy and perfunctory 
working on the part of police officials and the way they collect evidence.”254 The 
Appellate Court also noted that: 
The nature of the accusations overshadowed the Trial Court to such an 
extent that the court became oblivious of the fact that the standard of proof 
for establishing such an accusation, as required, is missing… Mere 
accusations should not have created a prejudice or a bias [in the court’s 
mind] and the duty of the court as ordered by the Holy Prophet (P.B.U.H) was 
to ascertain the facts and circumstances, and look for the truth with all the 
perseverance at its command…The trouble is that over the years bigotry and 
intolerance have made such deep inroads in our society that all three parties 
in the blasphemy cycle___ complainant, police officer and judge___ think that 
they are doing the right thing, and also earning divine favour into the 
bargain, when they are pressing charges under this [blasphemy] law. This 
zeal is sanctioned by law and clothed in self-righteousness.255 
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Finally, the Court cited a quotation (Hadith) of the Prophet (P.B.U.H) that “whenever 
even there is a mild chance, release the accused. For, releasing someone by an error 
on the part of a jurist is better than punishing someone by an error.”256 Hence, the 
court acquitted the accused from all the charges leveled against him, keeping in 
view the true teachings of Islam regarding the dispensation of justice. 
A more detailed criticism of the blasphemy law in Pakistan is the subject of next 
section. 
5. Critical Analysis of Pakistan’s Blasphemy Laws 
5.1. Basis of Pakistan’s Blasphemy Law is Wrong 
The Quran is the primary source of ‘Shariah’257 for Muslims, and it encourages 
freedom of expression. It directs Muslims not to be blind to their surroundings, but 
to try to find rational answers for questions relating to the existence of God and the 
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257Islamic canonical law based on the teachings of the Quran and the traditions of 
the Prophet Peace Be upon Him (Hadith and Sunnah), prescribing both religious and 
secular duties and sometimes retributive penalties for law breaking. It has generally 
been supplemented by legislation adapted to the conditions of the day, though the 
manner in which it should be applied in modern states is a subject of dispute 
between Islamic fundamentalists and modernists. Shariah or Islamic law consists of 
two sources which are the holy Quran and the life of Prophet Muhammad (P.B.U.H) 
also known as ‘Sunnah’.  It is an Arabic word and originates from ‘shar’ that means a 
clear road to water. Thus, Shariah is considered to be the right path and the most 
authentic way towards accomplishment of real success in life. ‘Sunnah’ means the 
practical demonstration of these golden principles by Prophet Muhammad (P.B.U.H) 
in his lifetime.  In sum, Shariah is the guiding set of rules deduced by the Muslim 
scholars after a detailed analysis of two primary sources of Islamic law i.e, Quran 
and Sunnah, the life of the Prophet Muhammad (P.B.U.H). 
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creation of this universe. The vast spread of Islam could be attributed to its support 
for freedom of opinion and rational reasoning. For instance, the Quran invites 
people, at multiple places, to ponder over, investigate and explore the truth by using 
their wisdom. Islam does not prohibit sincere efforts to explore the truth, and 
condemns baseless and frivolous allegations. These prohibitions are intended to 
create a society based on principles of mutual respect, tolerance and peaceful co-
existence. In this respect, Prophet Mohammad (P.B.U.H) once stated “A Muslim is 
one from whose tongue and hands other Muslims are safe.”258 
Keeping in view these reflections, it is argued that the prohibition on blasphemers in 
Islam is justified because they make false accusations against sacred ideals in 
contemptuous language, and this can cause turbulence in an otherwise peaceful 
society. At this critical juncture, the question arises as to what is, indeed, the true 
Islamic approach to dealing with unjustified blasphemous expressions? As well, 
whether such an approach is being followed in modern Islamic countries that have 
blasphemy laws?  
At the very outset, it is important to understand the meaning of blasphemy from the 
perspective of Islamic thought. Ibn Taymiyyah, a very eminent Islamic scholar and 
jurist who wrote extensively on the issue, explained blasphemy as a grave crime 
since the speaker insults, denigrates and ridicules the most important personages of 
Islam, like God and Prophets (Peace Be upon Them).  He considers blasphemy as 
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and Liberties in Islam Series (Islamic Texts Society, 1997) at 169.  
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“expressions of contempt for God, [ridiculing of his] names… laws, commands and 
prohibitions…[and] scoffing of prophets.”259  Others also say that a rejection of 
Angels, Holy Books and the Judgment Day also amounts to blasphemy of which the 
only prescribed punishment in Islam is death.260 
 But does ‘Shariah’ explicitly call for killing blasphemers? And is this a correct 
interpretation of the Islamic approach? These are the question that are analyzed in 
the remainder of this chapter. For this purpose, it is important to see how the 
Prophet of Islam, Muhammad (P.B.U.H), responded to incidents of blasphemy in the 
nascent state of Islam.  
Prophet Muhammad (P.B.U.H) spent his life up to the age of forty in the city of Mecca 
as a common Arabic man. He was not a literate person, but was known as the most 
honest among Arabs.  He married his first wife Khadijah, a renowned business 
woman, at her own proposal as she was impressed by his (P.B.U.H) honesty and 
uprightness.261 At the age of forty, when revelations from God started, Muhammad 
(P.B.U.H) went near Kabah262 and addressed Arabs asking if he told them that a huge 
army was to attack Mecca very soon, would they believe? Interestingly, everybody 
unanimously answered in the affirmative.  At that moment, Muhammad (P.B.U.H), 
expecting that people would now listen to his message, declared his prophecy to the 
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262 It is an ancient building of utmost religious importance in Mecca around which 
Muslims from all parts of the world perform pilgrimage. 
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people of Mecca. Unfortunately, with the exception of some, all others became his 
enemies. This enmity lasted for the next twenty three years until the peaceful 
transmission of power to the nascent Islamic state in 630 C.E.  
During the intervening period of struggle, agony and grief, his opponents insulted 
and ridiculed him on numerous occasions. He was called a magician, a cunning poet, 
a mad man, a self-proclaimed prophet, and himself the writer of the Quran. But 
despite all these insults, he always showed patience, tolerance, persuasion and 
forgiveness for those who rejected his message. He always tried to give sound 
answers to the questions and objections put forth by his adversaries. For, in the 
Quran, God Almighty had instructed him to follow the aforementioned principles on 
various occasions. Some of these principles are as follows:  
The Quran says to (Muhammad P.B.U.H): 
And you shall certainly hear much that will insult you from those who 
received the Scripture before you and from the polytheists. But, if you 
persevere patiently and guard against evil, this will be the best cause with 
which to determine your affairs.263 
In another place the Quran says:  
Among the followers of the Book, many would wish that they could turn you 
back to infidelity after you have believed— because of their envy after the 
truth is manifest to them. But forgive and overlook until God accomplishes 
his purpose.264 
Muhammad (P.B.U.H) was so generous a human being that he forgave blasphemers 
and opponents in the name of God Almighty, as he was taught by his Lord in the 
Quran. However, some scholars believe that Muhammad (P.B.U.H) did not prosecute 
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blasphemers in his time because of the feebleness and nascence of the Islamic state. 
Others contend that if Islam had permitted capital punishment for the offence of 
blasphemy, then he (P.B.U.H) would have ordered so. However, Muhammad 
(P.B.U.H) did not even impose any lesser punishment upon a blasphemer, saying at 
one occasion, “Let him who deliberately attributes a lie to me, take his seat in the 
fire [of hell].”265 Furthermore, the Prophet (P.B.U.H) pronounced a general amnesty 
for all and sundry in the city of Mecca when it yielded to become a part of the 
Islamic empire in 630 A.D. Therefore, scholars hold that according to the true spirit 
of Shariah, as ordained in the Quran and Sunnah, patience and reasoned response 
towards blasphemers is the true Islamic approach; it is the prerogative of God in the 
hereafter to decide whether to punish them or not. Thus, Prophet Muhammad 
(P.B.U.H) said, “No one may accuse another of disbelief, blasphemy or apostasy 
without manifest evidence and anyone who does so partakes of the charge 
himself.”266 
Scholars supporting blasphemy laws justify their stance in the light of the following 
Quranic verse which states: 
Verily, those who insult/annoy God and His Messenger have been cursed by 
God in this world and in the hereafter, and He has prepared for them a 
humiliating punishment. And those who insult/annoy— bear on themselves 
a calumny and a glaring sin.267 
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They believe that a person who commits blasphemy against God or His Messenger 
must be put to death because he has already been expressly cursed and pledged to a 
humiliated life in this world and hereafter by God Himself. He is considered one 
whose blood is ‘vain’ according to Quran and Sunnah. They maintain that such a 
person cannot claim any benefit or value for the property he accumulated, for he has 
created chaos and disorder in this world, so the only punishment suitable for him is 
death as a price for his sinister sin.268 
However, one does not find any references in either the Quran or the life of Prophet 
Mohammad (P.B.U.H) which explicitly mention that the only valid punishment for 
the offence of blasphemy is the sentence of death. Put another way, Islam prescribes 
punishments which are logical and just, thus insisting upon proportionality to 
encourage religious tolerance for accruing future benefits.269 As a matter of fact, the 
inference of capital punishment for blasphemy is a subjective interpretation of the 
above mentioned verse of the holy Quran. God has shown his displeasure against 
blasphemers by intimidating them with a cursed and humiliated life in this world 
and the hereafter. Nowhere in the Holy Quran did he order to killing these persons 
specifically.270 Therefore, some Muslim scholars contend that this sort of speculative 
interpretation of the Quran amounts to misinterpretation which should never be 
resorted to in an issue as important as blasphemy. 
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Likewise, Prophet Muhammad (P.B.U.H) stated, “Whoever charges another person 
[Muslim] with disbelief, or calls him an enemy of God while this is not so, will have 
the charge rebound upon himself.”271 Imam Abu Hanifa, an eminent Muslim legal 
scholar and the founder of ‘Hanafi’ school of thought, the largest one in Islam, said 
that not even ninety nine percent of doubt is sufficient to declare a Muslim as 
blasphemer or heretic, because it is up to God only to decide. Thus, Muslims are only 
burdened with the responsibility to guide others to the right path with reasoning, 
but they should not coerce or compel others by taking the law into their own hands 
to avenge blasphemy.272 
According to Islamic principles, no Muslim could be a blasphemer because the faith 
of a person ought not to be challenged on flimsy grounds, as it certainly requires a 
very high standard of proof in evidence.  Specifically speaking, Pakistan follows the 
Hanafi school of thought, and in light of the teachings of Imam Abu Hanifa, the 
current procedure adopted under the blasphemy laws in Pakistan is totally un-
Islamic. People are readily prosecuted under this system, but Imam Hanifa demands 
strong evidence in cases of blasphemy. The prevailing legislation is thus conducive 
to frantic, malicious prosecutions without the backing of appropriate evidence.   
Unfortunately, many modern Islamic states like Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Iran etc., 
do not observe the true guidance or teachings of Shariah, instead  they enforce 
harsh laws pertaining to blasphemy on the pretext of their being based on Islamic 
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principles. In essence, a Muslim cannot be convicted under the offence of blasphemy 
as provided in Pakistan Penal Code, 1860 because heresy is an offence of ‘Hadd’ for 
which no provision is available either in PPC or the Hudood Ordinance, 1979 stating 
that the punishment for heresy must be death. Therefore, I would reiterate my point 
that the very foundation of blasphemy laws in Pakistan is against the true spirit of 
Islam and teachings of the Holy Prophet (P.B.U.H), because Islam forbids Muslims 
from accusing others of the offence of blasphemy. It demands for strong evidence 
and expressly makes the punishment of blasphemy a prerogative of God. However, 
these fundamental ideals of Islam are ignored under the current Pakistani legal 
regime. Thus, it is appropriate to say that the current law of blasphemy in Pakistan 
has become a source of ridicule and mockery of religion, attracting enormous 
amount of misuse and criticism from the local public and western democratic 
societies. Next I discuss criticism of Pakistan’s blasphemy laws on Constitutional 
grounds.  
5.2 Challenging Blasphemy laws on Constitutional Grounds 
Against suppression or abuse of power by the government, freedom of expression 
and freedom of religion are two of the most important fundamental rights of citizens 
guaranteed by the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973.  
The relevant articles of the Constitution read as follows: 
Article 19: Freedom of Speech, etc. 
Every citizen shall have the right to freedom of speech and expression, and 
there shall be freedom of the press, subject to reasonable restrictions 
imposed by law in the interest of the glory of Islam or integrity, security or 
defense of Pakistan or any part thereof, friendly relations with foreign states, 
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public order, decency or morality, or in relation to contempt of Court, 
[commission of] or incitement to an offence. 
Article 20: Freedom to Profess Religion and to manage religious institutions 
Subject to law, public order and morality— 
(a) every citizen shall have the right to profess, practice and propagate his 
religion; and 
(b) every religious denomination and every sect thereof shall have the right 
to establish, maintain and manage its religious institutions.  
 
The prohibitions on blasphemy may give an impression of being justified because 
they are seemingly meant for the protection of the “glory of Islam”, “public order”, 
and “decency or morality” as enshrined in article 19, and “subject to law, public 
order and morality” under article 20 of the Constitution.273 But these provisions 
must not be construed as reasonable restrictions imposed by law on freedom of 
expression and religion because of their immensely broad nature and 
disproportional effects on fundamental rights. These constitutional provisions show 
that freedom of expression and religion are not absolute. However, they are also not 
completely unavailable to Pakistani citizens. The Judiciary has enough room to 
decide when these fundamental rights may reasonably be curtailed. However, no 
specific test or guidance, on how to achieve such a balance or determine which 
expression falls under the prohibited category, exists in Pakistan. Courts perform 
balance on a case by case analysis on the pretext of reasonableness. However, a 
basic theme that emerges from famous freedom of speech cases shows that the 
Supreme Court of Pakistan has interpreted these constitutional provisions to 
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expand the ambit of fundamental rights rather than curtail them despite the 
presence of overbroad prohibitory language in the above said provision.274 
Courts in Pakistan consider fundamental rights of expression and religion important 
for democracy.  Thus recent court decisions have shown a tendency towards 
protecting fundamental freedoms against undue state restrictions where substantial 
communitarian welfare was at risk due to governmental regulations. However, 
courts have also prohibited hateful expression because it reasonably fell under the 
restricting grounds as contained under article 19 and 20 mentioned above. 
Given this, I argue that blasphemy law in Pakistan although falls under the 
prohibitory scope of article 19 and 20, is repugnant to the underlying principles of 
both above mentioned articles. This is so because article 19 and 20 are invoked 
whenever state restrictions are so broad that they cannot reasonably justify 
prohibition on a fundamental right. In spite of this rendition, no court has ever tried 
to adjudicate a case of blasphemy under the rationale of freedom of expression or 
religion. Courts never saw blasphemy as an objectionable speech offence, but rather 
as an insult to God. They considered this area of law as out of their reach, such that a 
mere allegation of blasphemy superseded all principles of customary criminal law, 
such as innocence of the alleged, benefit of doubt and mens rea etc. But if they had 
adjudged blasphemous expression as an objectionable speech, they would have 
produced a more rational guidance for society regarding which expression is 
prohibited and what type of punishments would be more appropriate on grounds of 
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reasonableness. This approach would, therefore, have helped the society in 
becoming more tolerant of offensive expression, rather than adopting the 
fundamentalist nature that is being practiced now in Pakistan due to the religious 
aspect of the blasphemy law.  
Similarly, when a constitutional challenge was initiated in 1994 before the Supreme 
Court of Pakistan regarding blasphemy laws under article 20 of the Constitution, the 
Court, with respect, wrongly validated the law holding that regulation of freedom of 
religion was justified in Pakistan. I believe, had the Court paid heed to this sensitive 
issue and rightly decided blasphemy law as a prohibition severely limiting freedom 
of religion under article 20 of the Constitution of Pakistan, many innocent lives 
would have been saved who became victims of extra-judicial killings at the hands of 
religious fanatics in these past years.  Likewise, as indicated above, punishments 
could also have been reviewed and legitimized to be commensurate with the 
intensity of the act as a speech offence instead of an obstinate insistence on the 
death sentence due to considering it as an insult to God.  
5.3 Challenging Blasphemy Laws on the Basis of International Human Rights 
Law 
Apart from challenging blasphemy law as being un-Islamic or full of textual lacunas, 
they could very well be challenged on the basis of international human rights law. 
Despite the fact that Pakistan is a signatory to many international human rights 
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instruments, like the Charter of the United Nation (1945),275 International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (1966),276 and International Convention on the 
Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination (1969),277 it has miserably failed to 
perform its international obligations in this regard. More so since these important 
international covenants require the member states to eliminate all forms of 
discrimination so as to promote equality, liberty and freedom. Unfortunately, 
governments in Pakistan have successively failed to achieve these goals.  
Further, the political leadership in Pakistan has not been able to control religious 
fundamentalists, though the governments of Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto (1988-
1990 & 1993-1996), President Musharraf (1999-2008) and Prime Minister Gillani 
(2008-2013) sought to amend the blasphemy law. But eventually, they yielded to 
the religious radicals because they needed the support of the religious parties for 
the smooth running of their governments. It is more important to the politicians in 
Pakistan to protect their office than waste their time to protect innocent citizens. In 
this scenario, I take the initiatives promoted by Pakistan as hypocritic, suggesting it 
is intended to improve interfaith harmony and religious tolerance among Muslim 
nations.  Since “charity begins at home,” so it is incumbent upon the government in 
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Pakistan to create interfaith harmony between its own citizens. Then, it can suggest 
it others to do the same.278 
Therefore, I argue that the current blasphemy laws create radicalism and 
discrimination, in the society, thus making minorities petrified for their fate in the 
hands of majority. However, the Canadian criminal code hate speech provision (s. 
319 (2)) helps in achieving this objective of equality. It does not favour any 
particular religion, sect, cast, class or creed, and, thus, provides an atmosphere of 
mutual harmony in the society. I believe that adopting a hate speech provision 
based on the Canadian model in Pakistan would put Pakistan in conformity with its 
international obligations, and only then can it move towards creating Muslim 
brotherhood and achieving other godly goals. 
5.4 Political rather than Religious Background of Pakistan’s Blasphemy Laws 
As discussed earlier, blasphemy laws in Pakistan originated from the Indian Penal 
Code, 1860, which was promulgated by the British for undivided India.  Their 
objective was not to protect any particular religion, but only to ensure peace and 
order in the society by not letting anyone disturb the other’s religious feelings. In 
sum, these laws were designed to defend minorities so that they would not feel 
oppressed at the hands of the majority which gives an impetus to them for causing 
disturbance by rising against the oppressors.279However, after the emergence of 
Pakistan, president Zia-ul-Huq used the notion of Islam to protect and legitimize his 
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own despotic regime. Therefore, pre-partition laws were transformed into 
prosecuting devices to be used against minorities and political rivals, providing 
protection to the religion of majority thereby deviating from the original goals set 
up in the Indian Penal Code. 280 
The concept of blasphemy in Islam was intertwined with politics since the Prophet’s 
(P.B.U.H) days. Prosecution for renunciation of belief was ordered not because of 
religious concerns but because such acts were considered as rebellion against the 
newly born Islamic state.281 Prophet Muhammad (P.B.U.H) ordered executions in 
almost a dozen cases which had a political nature, but he granted pardon in 
numerous cases which involved contours of blasphemous acts.  The literature 
indicates that those dozen cases involved a combination of actions like treason, 
hostility to Islam, vilification of the Prophet (P.B.U.H), and rebellion in the form of 
helping the infidels of Mecca during war. Therefore, it is not correct historically to 
say that Prophet (P.B.U.H) ordered execution of blasphemers, as, clearly he granted 
pardon to those who insulted him as a religious person leaving this matter to God 
Almighty to decide, thus showing patience and tolerance as ordained in the holy 
Quran.282 But since he was also head of the state, he had the responsibility to protect 
the Islamic state from the dangers of mutiny. Therefore, he was constrained as the 
                                                          
280Supra, Chapter 3.ii  “The Zia Regime and the Death of a Secular State: 
Manipulation of Islam to Legitimize Dictatorship” 
281Forte, supra note 227 at 44. 
282 Please refer to the verses of the Holy Quran discussed above at 96-97. 
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head of state to punish those who revolted against the state by helping rivals of 
Islam, thus committing treason.283 
Therefore, I would argue that blasphemy is not a religious but political offence, 
according to Islamic perspectives. It ought not be punished as an offence because of 
its religious nature but it should be prosecuted on the grounds of maintenance of 
public peace and tranquility in society. As such, this focus on the political 
ramifications of blasphemy, rather than on limiting the expression of religious or 
political views is actually more in keeping with how blasphemy was used in pre-
partition India or in early days of Islam. Likewise, it should not entail such severe 
punishments since it is not a religious offence but instead those should be lighter 
ones enforced through narrowly designed provisions. This modern enlightened 
approach would help in saving the Pakistani society from the age old clutches of 
orthodoxy and intolerance that radicals have enslaved it.  
Some argue that Pakistan’s blasphemy laws are discriminatory as they only protect 
one particular religion. They consider “punishment under section 295-C PPC as a 
tempting tool in the hands of Muslim extremists to hold members of the religious 
minorities in religious-cum judicial blackmail for personal vendettas.”284 In their 
view, a government’s attestation that one religion is superior to others 
automatically results in oppression and discrimination towards minority religions 
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in a community.285 These scholars suggest that the scope of blasphemy laws in 
Pakistan must be expanded to include blasphemy towards other prophets (P.B.U.T) 
also as a criminal offence. This, they believe, would end the discrimination, 
vilification and social tension in society which springs from religious differences.286 
I do not agree with this argument, since a law which is already so broad in scope, if 
expanded, will increase the number of prosecutions. Moreover, Pakistan is a multi-
religious community with a difference in ideals between Islam and other religions. 
Therefore, a provision which is already so broad in nature cannot be expected to 
equally protect two different opinions. For example, Muslims believe that there is no 
god but God Almighty having no successor or offspring, while Christians believe that 
Jesus Christ (P.B.U.H) is the son of God. Now, to put these two contradictory 
concepts in a provision would be logically incorrect, so a consensus over the precise 
definition of blasphemy is very difficult to achieve. Instead, I would again 
recommend modernizing the idea of punishing blasphemy as a breach of peace 
[hate speech] offence, rather than a religious one. Since, an amended law will have a 
proviso relating to hatred spread on the basis of religion, and would not favour any 
particular religion etc., consequently ending discrimination in the society. 
5.5 Overbroad Nature of Blasphemy Laws 
Pakistan is a common law country and its penal code is largely the same as was 
designed by the British in 1860, except the blasphemy laws. The common law 
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principles require that a penal provision must clearly describe the act or omission 
which is prohibited and liable to be prosecuted by the state. Therefore, legislation 
which is too broad in scope is considered flawed, if it enhances the risk of arbitrary 
action or enforcement, creating room for its misuse. The laws related to blasphemy 
in Pakistan are one such example because they are also too broad in scope. They are 
not based on Islamic injunctions or teachings which they claim to protect. And, the 
text used in this provision is so vague in meaning that it could be dragged in any 
direction through an interpretation which extends the possibility of malicious 
prosecution of innocent citizens. For instance, I am a true Muslim who loves the 
Prophet Muhammad (P.B.U.H), and I have staunch faith in Islam. I have written this 
paper sincerely to do an objective analysis of the precarious situation in Pakistan, 
and to figure out a solution for the chaos. But even this neutral academic effort may 
be dragged into the ambit of blasphemy because of the vague and open ended 
provisions in Pakistani Laws on the subject. This is so because, “words [which] 
either spoken or written, or by visible representation or by any imputation, 
innuendo or insinuation directly or indirectly, defile the sacred name of the Holy 
Prophet Muhammad (P.B.U.H)” is the criterion for establishing guilt.  
Another aspect worth mentioning here is the fragility of academic discussions on 
the issue of blasphemy in Pakistan. These are scant due to an overwhelming risk of 
being dragged into the broad ambit of blasphemy.  One example was Dr. Younas 
Sheikh’s case discussed earlier. This is so because no proviso on any exceptions or 
defenses has been attached to the penal provision of blasphemy S.295-C in Pakistan. 
This fact also reinforces the idea that these laws are intended to proscribe any 
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disregard for the principles and teachings of Islam. Clearly, this is evident from even 
a bare reading of the Holy Quran which explicitly invites people to ponder on the 
universe and their own existence. Unfortunately, blasphemy laws do not allow the 
raising of any questions against a misinterpreted religious idea prevalent in society. 
In addition, those who dare to do this face being charged for the offence of 
blasphemy themselves. Likewise, these individuals become prey to extra-judicial 
killings at the hands of extremists if they are somehow saved from prosecution. 
Extremists impliedly consider their barbaric acts as legitimate because of the 
existence of the death penalty as the only valid sentence for blasphemy in law. So in 
their zeal to gain religious virtue, they kill those they consider to be blasphemers.  
As well, S. 295-C PPC has no proviso referring to the defense of private 
conversations, and, thus anyone could accuse another of committing blasphemy 
without even having fair evidence to prove this allegation. In this regard, the 
likelihood of the blasphemy law being misused to victimize an opponent is clear, as 
already discussed. Thus, it is quite possible that a person can be falsely accused of 
blasphemy committed in private communications. Similarly, he might be killed 
extra-judicially by a religious fanatic or a self assumed ‘soldier of Islam’ for whom it 
is sufficient evidence of guilt if a person is merely accused of blasphemy.  
In my view, these provisions have no justification under the common law because of 
their vagueness and ambiguity.  They do not give clear guidance as to what 
expression may be considered blasphemous, and are conducive to creating a more 
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radical society in Pakistan.287   Therefore, I would suggest that the law must be 
modernized by providing safeguards to minimize the likelihood of its misuse. I 
propose the Canadian hate speech model as a guideline provided under section 
319(2) of the Canadian Criminal Code. These concerns were also raised against this 
provision, but the Supreme Court of Canada repeatedly held that it is not a broad 
law, and gives proper guidance/defenses in relevance to speech which may or may 
not be censored. The Court opined in the Whatcott case in2013 that the section only 
curtails intentionally damaging hateful expression while allowing inquiries made in 
good faith and for research purposes. Thus, I argue that Pakistan must also adopt a 
similar approach instead of blasphemy laws. This new law must consist of defenses 
such as mens rea; good faith; private conversation; research; religious freedom etc., 
thus limiting its misuse to a great extent. 
5.6 The Mens Rea Dilemma 
Intent is an essential ingredient in most of criminal offences. Same is the case with 
blasphemy, since it must also require proving that the accused had a reasonable 
knowledge and intention of the consequences of his malicious acts regarding their 
capability to outrage the feelings of a particular class of people. Now if being 
cognizant of the consequences, the accused still deliberately resorts to malicious 
actions conducive to causing turbulence in the society, then he should bear the 
consequences of his deeds.288 
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Keeping this in view, in both England and India, the common law countries which 
have greatly inspired the legal regime in Pakistan, ‘intent’ was the most essential 
ingredient to constitute the offence of blasphemy. However, an orthodox or 
conservative version of both Islamic and common law regimes is being currently 
followed in Pakistan. According to section 295-C PPC, intention is not an important 
ingredient of the offence of blasphemy. The mere act is considered punishable if it is 
committed without any extraneous pressure or duress. The said provision is 
founded on the presumption that intention is not needed to be proven since a 
person speaks what is in his mind and heart. So, intention is presumed from the 
nature of an accused’s statement, whether he actually intended to renounce Islam or 
outrage people.289  This makes it an orthodox strict liability offence.290 Needless to 
say, it is extremely undesirable for a crime which carries the death sentence as its 
only valid punishment, to infer intention from a statement without resorting to its 
context or the element of intention. For example, if a common man is asked some 
religious questions touching faith and he answers them according to his 
understanding, he may be dragged as a blasphemer in the course of giving answers 
without considering the context in which those statements were made. On the other 
hand, a dexterous writer may escape liability for his blasphemous statements if he 
camouflages his words by employing literary tactics.291 
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Furthermore, exceptions like unsound mind, forced intoxication, good faith, and age 
are common considerations before affixing criminality all over the world. However, 
it is very strange that people accused of blasphemy have been denied all these 
genuine defenses even which could have had them exonerated from criminality or 
reduced their punishments to a minimum. As discussed earlier, this was the 
situation for Salamat Masih and Rimsha Masih, the teenagers charged under this 
law.  
Many such cases exist in Pakistan. In fact, online news articles on blasphemy laws in 
Pakistan provide details of such cases. All the cases demonstrate that section 295-C 
PPC, 1860, just like the defenses of intellectual discussion and intention, does not 
accommodate defenses like insanity, minority and old age etc. While, it is an 
acknowledged fact that these persons do not have control over their mind to foresee 
the consequences of their act, so in absence of malicious intention it is highly unjust 
to charge them for blasphemy. Given this, it is very unfortunate that blasphemy laws 
being broad in scope are implemented on everyone alike without any exceptions.  
I believe the way blasphemy law is being construed in the legal system of Pakistan is 
against the spirit of natural justice, and it is inhumane and un-Islamic.  Islam sets a 
very high standard of evidence to prove the guilt of an accused considering him 
innocent until proven guilty. Prophet Mohammad (P.B.U.H) declared on numerous 
occasions that it is better to set free a hundred culprits than convict an innocent 
person. Likewise, he said that the killing of one man without legal justification is like 
killing the whole of humanity. Indeed, Islam puts a very high burden of proof on the 
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complainant to prove the guilt of the accused beyond any shadow of reasonable 
doubt before punishing him.292 
Therefore, I would argue that authorities in Pakistan must not infer or presume the 
existence of malicious intention in cases of blasphemy from the mere statements 
only. One suggestion is to modernize these blasphemy laws by providing exceptions 
or defenses. Similarly, Courts should take judicial notice of the quantum and 
proportionality of the sentence whenever a case of blasphemy comes before them 
for adjudication on a case by case basis considering it a speech offense rather than 
an insult to God and religion. 
5.7 Burden of Proof or “TAZKIYAH-TU-SHAHOOD”293 
The qualification of a witness and standard of evidence to prove a certain fact has 
been amply elucidated in the Holy Quran. In Zia regime, Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 
1984(Q.S.O)294  was introduced to make the law of evidence accord with injunctions 
                                                          
292 “Tazkiyah-tu-Shahood” is a test for appraising the credibility of the witnesses 
according to Islamic standards of piousness and truthfulness. See discussion, infra. 
293  In sum, it means that the witnesses must be highly virtuous and pious people, 
and their number should be between 2- 4 ‘male’ witnesses as required by the 
intensity of the crime. For example, in rape cases the intensity is higher so 4 people 
are required; in cases of drug or alcohol use the intensity is lower so less witnesses 
are required. In this light, my view is that in blasphemy the intensity is much higher 
so more witnesses should be required. The test also demands that if a witness is 
unable to fulfill these requirements of piety and truthfulness or at anytime makes a 
contradictory statement his credibility must not be accepted, thus making him a 
hostile witness. 
294The Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, Act No. 10; This is the amended version of the 
same Evidence Act, 1872 that British promulgated for undivided India. Eventually, 
Pakistan adopted the Act on its independence in 1947 and the title of the Act was 
then changed by Zia during his regime to bring it in conformity with his islamization 
claims. The content of the law barely changed however; changing the title was still 
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of Islam as laid down in the Holy Quran and Sunnah. According to Islamic 
injunctions, the burden and quality of evidence to prove guilt increases with the 
nature and sensitivity of a crime. The Holy Quran ordains that witnesses must 
conform to the test of ‘Tazkiyah-tu-Shahood’ in those crimes where punishment is 
very high as in the case of Zina.295This would include blasphemy as it entails capital 
punishment, so Islam has forbidden Muslims from raising false allegations of 
disbelief against someone, and required substantial proof wherever guilt is alleged. 
Unfortunately, however, the credibility of witnesses and quality of evidence 
adduced in cases of blasphemy in Pakistan has been very weak. Despite this, as is 
evident from the cases reviewed above, judges have convicted and sentenced to 
death many accused persons by relying on mere allegations in the absence of sound 
and credible incriminating evidence. The basic reason behind this casual manner of 
the judges is the very text of  the provision under section 295-C PPC,1860, which 
does not make ‘intention’ an essential element to prove the offence of blasphemy, so 
it does not require any evidence to prove the same.  On another note, it is a biased 
system of prosecution since it is sensitive to the emotions of only one side 
completely ignoring the other which is not even given the right to fair trial to agitate 
its’ innocence. Although the principle behind penalizing blasphemy may be correct 
religiously, but Islam is a religion of peace and forgiveness so it prefers to pardon 
than to penalize.  
                                                          
seen by many as a positive step toward achieving the so called Islamic goals 
acclaimed by Zia. 
295 An offence of forcibly committing rape as defined in Hudood Ordinance, 1979 i.e 
sexual harassment etc. The punishment is expressly defined in the Holy Quran. 
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Where the state decides to prosecute a person then a very heavy burden of proof is 
laid on the prosecution to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt, which in the 
current scenario is completely absent. Thus, it has been observed in a number of 
blasphemy cases that both the requirements of heavy burden of proof on 
prosecution and sound reliable evidence have been miserably ignored by trial 
courts in Pakistan. However, at the Appellate level, Courts have been gracious 
enough in solving the matter seriously by not confirming to the biased and orthodox 
legal trends, since they correctly appraised evidence and released many innocent 
victims. Thus, in my view, as the proposed hate speech law would require 
substantial evidence to prove intention and provide relevant defenses, trial courts 
would acquit victims at the early stage due to lack of evidence. They would test the 
credibility and quality of incriminating evidence or witnesses and, thus, this 
approach would drastically limit the misuse of the blasphemy law in Pakistan.  
Further, those who falsely accuse others of blasphemy have impunity because there 
is no punishment provided in law for making a false allegation of blasphemy against 
someone. Therefore, many people suggest that the cases of blasphemy must only be 
heard by courts at the Appellate level, so that the constitutional requirements of fair 
trial and due process may be ensured. Consequently, the accused may also be saved 
from the agony of misuse of law which often and continuously results in false 
conviction or extra-judicial killings in Pakistan.296 However, I believe that 
                                                          
296Mahboob, supra note 253: the Honourable Chowhan J of the Appellate Court 
analyzed the history of blasphemy laws in Islam and Pakistan to conclude that Islam 
does not recommend such an orthodox ideology. He vehemently criticized the 
prevalent investigatory and prosecutorial system in Pakistan taking note of the 
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introduction of a hate speech law in Pakistan’s penal code would also reduce such 
incidents because people would not be sentenced so frantically as done now under 
the current blasphemy law. Along with other defenses (i.e lack of mens rea, good 
faith, academic discussions and private communication), the law must have a 
proviso requiring the Attorney General’s approval before commencing criminal 
proceedings against those alleged of blasphemy. Similarly, if the law also had a 
proviso to punish those who falsely accuse others of blasphemy, the remaining 
misuse potential of this provision and other contributing factors would also 
mitigate.  
5.8  Miscalculated Objectives of Pakistan’s Blasphemy Laws and Strict 
Punishments 
It is noteworthy that section 295-C PPC, 1860, provides the strictest punishment 
known under Pakistan’s criminal law. Originally, the punishment was up to life 
                                                          
minimum efforts done by the investigating officers and the prosecutors in furthering 
the ends of justice. Consequently, he encouraged legislators to adopt some 
suggestions made by him through which the defects so prominent in the law could 
be controlled. For instance, he put forth that only a Sessions judge should hear the 
case as a court of first instance because lower court judges have immense workload 
and pressure from the public, hence making them unable to handle matters of 
blasphemy effectively. Secondly, he suggested that a police officer having 17th scale 
should investigate matters of blasphemy, rather than current policemen who are 
barely educated and are severely corrupt. Third, he opined that the Attorney 
General must first approve of a complaint before criminal proceedings are initiated 
against someone accused of blasphemy. As well, prosecutors must carefully analyze 
evidence and circumstances of false allegation before laying charges so that the 
accused may be saved from going through the horrid agony of a false trial and 
possible death sentence or even extra-judicial killings. All these suggestions, even by 
the highest court of the largest province of Punjab, Pakistan, fell on deaf ears and 
nothing has changed in the draconian law to the present day. 
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imprisonment. The death sentence was added to it in 1986, and the sentence of 
imprisonment for life was removed in 1991. So now, the death sentence and fine are 
the only punishments. 
 Given this, those who support the idea of imposing strict punishments for the 
offence of blasphemy argue that if there are no such penal laws or the judicial doors 
are closed, then every other person will dare to commit blasphemy with impunity.  
Moreover, in the absence of blasphemy laws or a regulatory mechanism, angry 
fanatics may take the law into their own hands to exact revenge on alleged 
blasphemers.297 However, in most of the cases relating to blasphemy which were 
initiated on account of malicious prosecutions, it has been observed that the accused 
are released by the Appellate courts. So in my view, the argument that the absence 
of such laws would encourage blasphemers to do the act more frequently does not 
hold good. For, despite the existence of such laws, accused are released by the 
Appellate courts in final appraisal due to faulty preceding prosecutions. On the other 
hand, these laws have played a negative role by encouraging intolerance in society, 
because mere statements or disagreement may be dragged within the pseudo 
definition of blasphemy. Thus, if the state is not willing to initiate prosecution, many 
would take it as their religious duty to purge the world of the alleged blasphemer. 
These laws are thus producing results which they were designed to avoid, because 
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Canadian Criminal Code s. 140—Public Mischief—i.e making false accusations 
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they prescribe capital punishment for the offence of blasphemy and so encourage 
assassins to enforce it extra-judicially out of their so called religious convictions.  
In contrast, it could safely be argued that blasphemy is not an offence of ‘Hadd’ 
because nowhere in the Quran has the death penalty been described as a mandatory 
punishment for it. Therefore, it is indeed an offence of ‘Ta’zir’298  in which the judge 
exercises his discretion to decide the quantum or nature of punishment for the 
offender. The punishments of ‘Ta’zir’ are lighter and lenient in nature as compared 
to the ones imposed as ‘Hadd’, since they have been deduced by religious scholars 
after a detailed scrutiny of the injunctions of Quran and Sunnah.299 
It is noteworthy that ‘heresy’ has neither been defined as an offence in Pakistan nor 
any punishment of ‘Hadd’ is provided for the same. Therefore, logically speaking, if a 
Muslim cannot commit the offence of blasphemy then naturally non-Muslims could 
be the only target of this crime in Pakistan.  
Further, this offence entails only ‘Ta’zir’ punishments, so in these circumstances its 
punishment should be lesser and lenient. Besides this, the sanction of government in 
favour of death penalty for blasphemy becomes conducive to extra-judicial killings 
of the victims because fanatics believe it as a warranted action. Therefore, law of 
blasphemy needs to be modernized instead of treating it as merely a religious 
                                                          
298A punishment which has not been specifically mentioned in the holy Quran is 
called ‘tazir’ or discretionary punishment. These are flexible punishments according 
to attending circumstances of the crime, and Muslim scholars have denoted them in 
the light of Islamic principles/ teachings over the various past centuries. 
299Kamali, supra note 258 at 228; Forte, supra note 224 at 47. 
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legislation. For the sake of argument its rationale may be considered valuable for an 
Islamic society as in Pakistan, but abundance of textual flaws and procedural 
vacuums make it a defective legislation. In addition, it is so vulnerable to misuse that 
it needs to be rejuvenated according to the modern democratic standards. In this 
backdrop, I propose that the underlying objective of blasphemy law should be the 
same as of a narrowly designed provision of hate speech.300 For, prevention of hate 
propagated on the basis of religion is an important objective of most of the modern 
hate speech laws. Further, this objective has also been considered valid by various 
countries and international institutions. Therefore, adopting this objective would 
promote a culture of tolerance, thus limiting the extremist behavior manifested by 
certain sections of society in Pakistan. On the other hand, this extremist behavior is 
exacerbated by government’s sanction of death penalty as the only solution to 
vindicate blasphemy. Thus, adopting right approach in this regard will prove helpful 
in controlling the misuse of law of blasphemy. Similarly, it will also save innocent 
victims from becoming prey to fanatics due to the vagueness or broadness of this 
law by providing defenses and lesser punishments for those who happen to commit 
the crime.  
5.9 Blasphemy and Repentance 
There are four famous Islamic schools of thought in various Islamic countries. They 
are Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi’i, and Hanbali. A majority in Pakistan follows the Hanafi 
school of thought which has its reflection in Pakistan’s legislation. Categorically 
                                                          
300 Protection of peace and order in society through protection of religious hatred 
128 
 
speaking, blasphemy law is no exception, so it must also be in consonance with 
principles of Hanafi school of thought. But, section 295-C PPC, 1860, is not in accord 
with the jurisprudential spirit of Hanafi ideology. Rather, it contradicts on very basic 
grounds. One such contradiction is found in the concept of repentance. Hanafi 
scholars argue that anyone who commits blasphemy or apostasy must be given an 
opportunity to repent for his sins. They consider blasphemy, as discussed earlier, a 
‘Ta’zir’ offence the punishment for which is decided by the judge according to 
circumstances of the case. They contend that Prophet Muhammad (P.B.U.H) was 
also merciful to his foes who were disrespectful to him and denied his prophet-hood 
providing them opportunities to repent for their sins and adopt the righteous path. 
For instance, on one occasion He (P.B.U.H), instead of penalizing instantly, gave 
three days for rethinking to a woman accused who had renounced Islam and aided 
the infidels of Mecca in war of ‘Uhad.’301 So, it is vehemently contended by Hanafi 
scholars that since repentance is an integral part of Islamic legal system, a person 
                                                          
301 In early days of Islam, the infidels of ‘Mecca’ plotted to kill Muhammad (P.B.U.H). 
However, through God’s revelation he was ordered to migrate to ‘Medina’ overnight. 
Islam prosperously flourished after this migration and his opponents detested this 
increase in his followers. Eventually, they organized a large army of over one 
thousand men to attack ‘Medina’ and the small number of Muhammad’s followers. 
The confrontation took place near the mountain of ‘U-had’. This is why the war is 
known as the war of ‘U-hadd’. Further, since Islam was still at an early stage there 
were many hypocrites who claimed that they were Muslims but secretly helped the 
infidels of Mecca in this war. They provided information of the activities of Muslims 
and Muhammad (P.B.U.H) and assured their support through attack on Muslim 
women and children from inside Medina while Muslim men were engaged in 
fighting with the opponent army. However, Muslims dominated in this war and 
defeated the opponent army despite the sheer number of Muslim army. Later, many 
of these hypocrites were charged with treason and blasphemy where some of them 
were forgiven for their blasphemous act while others were prosecuted for treason. 
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who commits blasphemy should also be given a chance to repent before punishing 
him.302 
In contrast, scholars from other schools of Islamic thought present a somewhat 
blurred picture. Some of them believe in an immediate conviction of the one who 
commits blasphemy, while others take a lenient view to give him the chance to 
repent for his sin. Further, scholars who support taking a lenient view have 
difference of opinion over the time given to the accused to repent as whether it 
should be one day, three days, one month or unlimited period.  Likewise, they 
disagree over the issue of repentance by non-Muslims: some hold that it could only 
be accepted if the accused converts to Islam.  
I believe that the silence of section 295-C PPC, 1860, over the issue of repentance 
has encouraged fundamentalists to take the law into their own hands without 
leaving any room for repentance.  This is quite understandable, as these extremist 
elements get implied support from the very text of this provision. The provision 
supports the punishment by death only, without allowing any sort of repentance. So 
they consider their action of out-right killing of one accused of blasphemy to be 
warranted under the law. Similarly, the argument that repentance of a non-Muslim 
cannot be accepted unless they convert to Islam is not well founded in my view. 
Rather, it is against the express verse of the Holy Quran which says “There is no 
compulsion in the religion [Islam].”303 
                                                          
302Kamali, supra note 258 at P222-236. 
303 Ibid at 88. 
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Against this backdrop, it could be safely argued that the law of blasphemy as 
enshrined in section 295-C PPC, 1860, in its present form is not only repugnant to 
the common law, but also against the Islamic principles of the ‘Hanafi’ school of 
thought, the one followed by the majority in Pakistan. Moreover, the absence of the 
element of ‘repentance’ in the text of the said provision has also given rise to 
religious intolerance. It is imperative for the government to modernize the law of 
blasphemy with addition of the above said features keeping in view the lenient view 
taken in Islam so that misuse of law could be diminished. Thus, an amended law 
should be set in motion only against those individuals who have committed the act 
of blasphemy with deliberate knowledge and intention to outrage the religious 
feelings of the followers of a particular religion. Keeping in view the Islamic 
principle that exonerating hundred culprits would be better than punishing even a 
single innocent person, it is far better to free a real culprit owing to flawed 
legislation than to victimize any innocent soul on the altar of a broad and draconian 
law of blasphemy.   
5.10 Judges and Blasphemy  
Unfortunately, cases pertaining to blasphemy in Pakistan have been mishandled by 
trial courts since they are affected by their own peculiar problems and extraneous 
factors which have played a very negative role in the delivery of justice. Judges in 
Pakistan are paid normal salaries, but they have a huge amount of work to deal with, 
so they are always overburdened. They face pressures from different corners, such 
as government, higher judiciary, bars, press, and society. Thus, they cannot pay 
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equal attention to each case due to such an enormous amount of workload and 
pendency.  So they treat cases of blasphemy in a routine way like other cases 
ignoring the sensitivities and implications attached to them.  
 It has been frequently observed that their judgments result in convictions since 
they do not want to risk their lives for saving the ones who are charged with 
blasphemy. They prefer to convict the accused, notwithstanding the standard or 
reliability of evidence, leaving the matter to be finally rectified by the courts at the 
Appellate level. The matter lingers on for a long time until the appeal is fixed before 
an Appellate court, thus wasting many precious years of the life of an innocent 
victim who also constantly faces the risk of being killed by fanatics during this 
period of detention. Increased salaries, less workload, better protection of life, and 
improved training could be a solution. But I think that if the law remains open 
ended, having no regard for intention, thus, providing no defenses to victims. And, if 
death sentence remains the only valid punishment for the offence, judges would still 
find themselves in a predicament position not favorable to acquit victims due to 
threats from fundamentalists. This is so because, so long as the focus is purely on 
religion, it is easier for these radicals to see every acquittal as an insult to God or 
another blasphemy in itself. However, if blasphemy is modernized under hate 
speech law and the focus is shifted from religion to political matters, there would be 







In conclusion, I have described the gloomy and desperate picture demonstrating the 
misuse of blasphemy law in Pakistan. It has indeed become an easy way to unleash 
ones’ vendetta against opponents by putting them in jail for many years for a false 
accusation over a crime they never committed. In the light of above discussion, I 
hold that textual broadness, procedural irregularities, social fanaticism, absence of 
defenses or exceptions in the law, and above all, harsh punishment like death 
penalty, have collectively contributed to make section 295-C PPC, 1860, a very 
dangerous legislation. There is a dire need to reform and modernize this law 
immediately keeping in view the real spirit of Islam and established principles of 
criminal justice. It is not only a defective legislation; it also gives rise to intolerance 
in society which ultimately plays havoc with other aspects of life that are already 
disturbed in Pakistan.   
Thus, I have argued that blasphemous prosecutions are politically, socially, 
economically and culturally motivated while religion is only used as a legitimizing 
tool by opportunists. Freedom of expression is a quintessential right in a democracy. 
It has an interactive relationship with other fundamental rights. But no right is 
absolute; thus there is room for some regulation of free expression even in a society 
that has freedom of speech as a fundamental democratic value.  For this reason, I 
believe that a narrowly designed criminal provision which prohibits hate speech, 
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while clearly defining what is prohibited and providing appropriate defenses, is a 
justified limit on freedom of expression. 
I have argued that blasphemy, to the extent it should be dealt with by the law, 
should be regarded a sub-category of hate speech. My thesis is that blasphemy 
should not be a separate crime instead some aspects of blasphemy should be dealt 
with under a more modern conception of carefully designed hate speech laws. 
Similarly, punishments prescribed for the offence of blasphemy, after being 
stipulated as hate speech, must extensively be curtailed. Overall, I suggest, no 
punishment for orthodox blasphemy laws but a lesser degree of punishment for the 
modern hate speech offence. 
The law should concern itself only with those aspects of blasphemy which incite 
hatred against a group which is identifiable on the basis of religion. More 
specifically, I have argued that Pakistan should repeal its blasphemy law and instead 
introduce a criminal provision patterned on the Canadian hate speech section of the 
Criminal Code (s319). 
Canada has been selected as a cogent example for its extensive system of hate 
speech regulation, in light of the fact that the importance of free speech has not been 
denied there. Canada’s example reinforces the argument that if a law to proscribe 
only a particular category of speech is carefully designed to extend reasonable 
exceptions to eliminate the chances of misuse, then it may be justified in a free and 
democratic society. Such legislation cannot be seen as blindly sweeping down the 
slippery slope, because it would limit only a particular kind of expression without 
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affecting other freedoms. It would also leave no unbridled discretionary powers in 
the hands of the government, courts, or the majority 
These provisions would permit expressions like satire, humor and disagreement, 
and would be invoked only when the limits of decency are crossed and violence is 
apparent in light of the cultural, historical legal and religious context of the society 
at hand. The law would also provide measures or supervisory mechanisms to 
control its misuse or abuse. It would not only control hate speakers but also those 
who may try to take the law into their own hands to promote extremism. 
Further, Canada has gone through the hate regulation debate and, having 
considered the arguments for and against regulation, has decided to uphold criminal 
hate speech prohibitions. It has succeeded in creating equilibrium between freedom 
of expression and censorship of hate speech, and, thus is a guiding model for 
countries that need to diminish hate and intolerance within their borders. 
The hate speech provisions of the Criminal Code are much more precisely worded 
and have been upheld by the Supreme Court of Canada as a justifiable infringement 
of freedom of expression.  Therefore, I believe that the harms relating to blasphemy 
which the state could justifiably attempt to control are those aspects which 
resemble hate speech. Section 319 is narrowly designed, has proper defenses and 
cannot be invoked without permission from the Attorney General. This seriously 
curtails the potential for the kinds of misuses described in the above discussion on 
Pakistan’s blasphemy laws.  While s. 319 does infringe freedom of religion and 
expression, I agree with the analysis of the Supreme Court of Canada that such an 
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infringement is justifiable. Once hate speech provisions are added to the criminal 
law in Pakistan, the current overly broad blasphemy section could be repealed. 
Finally, I would again argue that the current blasphemy laws create radicalism and 
discrimination, in the society, thus making Pakistani society petrified for their fate 
in the hands of fundamentalists. However, the proposed Canadian criminal code 
hate speech provision helps in achieving the objective of equality and modernism. It 
does not favour any particular religion, sect, cast, class or creed, and, thus, provides 
an atmosphere of mutual harmony in the society. I believe that adopting a hate 
speech provision based on the Canadian model in Pakistan is an objective which 
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